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Comment
An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act:
A Merciful End to a Terminally Ill Criminal Tradition
I. INTRODUCTION

In October of 1996, Nancy DeSoto left her home in Bourbonnais,
Illinois, and traveled to suburban Detroit to see Dr. Jack Kevorkian.'
There, in a strange hotel room, Dr. Kevorkian gave Nancy a breathing
mask connected to a metal canister and showed her how to turn on the
gas.2 A victim of Lou Gehrig's disease, Nancy ended her life through
the narcosis of carbon monoxide poisoning.3 The local prosecutor
filed no charges, although her death was officially ruled a homicide.4
Despite it being a criminal offense in nearly every American
jurisdiction,5 including Illinois,6 doctors and the friends and family of
ill patients continue to engage in "assisted suicide," largely unbothered

1. David Lawder, Kevorkian Brings 43rd Assisted Death to Hospital, REUTERS, Oct.
17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Dr. Kevorkian is a well
known advocate of physician-assisted suicide. Id. In addition to Nancy DeSoto, Dr.
Kevorkian is reported to have provided the means for at least 42 others to end their
lives. Id. Dr. Kevorkian is credited with putting the issue on the national agenda,
beginning with his first reported assistance in 1990. Melinda Beck et. al., The Doctor's

Suicide Van,

NEWSWEEK,

June 18, 1990, at 46.

2. See Lawder, supra note 1.
3. Kevorkian Aids in Woman's Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A15. Dr.
Kevorkian sometimes provides those wishing to die with a device consisting of a
breathing mask, connected to a bottle of carbon monoxide. Don Colburn, Debate on
Assisted Suicide Gains Steam, WASH. POST, May 10, 1994, at Z8. The user commits
suicide by turning a switch that allows the gas to flow into the mask, where the patient
inhales it. Id. The effect is that the person first becomes unconscious, then dies of
insufficient oxygen. Ian Harvey, Right to Die Activist Speaks From the Grave,
TORONTO SUN (Final Edition), May 9, 1996, at 7. It is a physically painless experience.
Catherine Gibbs, Debate Over Kindest Death for Animals, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 5,
1996 at B 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
4. Kevorkian Aids in Woman's Suicide, supra note 3, at Al 5.
5. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
6. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (criminalizing
the inducement to commit suicide, and making it a Class 2 felony). See also infra note
72 (providing relevant text of statute).
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by legal sanctions.7 The result is an unsatisfactory nether land where
the practice is neither legal and regulated, nor effectively illegal. 8
This Comment begins by examining the history of physicianassisted suicide as a crime. 9 Next, it explores the relationship between
dying and the law, including the doctrine of informed consent,'0 and
the principle of "double effect."'" This Comment then examines
constitutional foundations of the right to die, 12 and the law of
physician-assisted suicide in Illinois. 3 Discussing the present legal
status of physician-assisted suicide, this Comment reviews the
contemporary crime of assisting a suicide, 14 and the role of double
effect. 5 This Comment next examines legislative efforts to legalize
physician-assisted suicide, and analyzes the provisions 6 and outcomes
of modern legislative efforts.' 7 A discussion' 8 and analysis' 9 of the
constitutional implications of physician-assisted suicide laws follows.
This Comment then analyzes the crime of assisting a suicide 20 and its
relation to double effect. 2' Next, various approaches to statutory
legalization of physician-assisted suicide are examined.22 To end the
uncertainty and to protect the rights of the terminally ill, this Comment
proposes that the Illinois General Assembly adopt a law 23 authorizing
physician-assisted suicide.

7. Prosecutions for assisting a suicide are rare and convictions even more scarce. No
physician has been successfully prosecuted for assisting a patient in committing
suicide. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
8. See Julia Pugliese, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1293 (1993).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part ll.B.
I I. See infra Part II.C. In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the "double
effect" refers to the practice of giving a terminally ill patient a lethal dose of pain
killers, knowing it will kill him, but with the sole intention to relieve pain.
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. See infra Part II.E.
14. See infra Part III.A
15. See infra Part III.A.3.
16. See infra Part III.B.I.
17. See infra Part III.B.2.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See infra Part IV.D.
23. See infra Part V and Appendix A.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. TraditionalCriminal Treatment of Physician-assistedSuicide
In medieval England, committing suicide was considered a criminal
act.24 This policy endured and was maintained by the American
colonies, and later by some states within the United States.2 At
common law, one who assisted in a suicide was also guilty of a
crime-accessory to suicide. 26 Usually, such persons were charged
either with murder or manslaughter." As long as suicide itself
remained a punishable offense, it was not necessary to establish an
independent crime of assisting a suicide.'
A difficulty arose when the states universally de-criminalized
suicide.29 This mass elimination did not reflect a new societal

24.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.8 (2d

ed. 1986). Laws against suicide have their origin in Judeo-Christian values, particularly
the principle of the sanctity of life. See Richard Doerflinger, Assisted Suicide: ProChoice or Anti-Life?, in MORAL ISSUES AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 363 (Paul Jersild & Dale
Johnson eds. 1993). This ethic includes the idea that any life is better than no life at all.
JERRY B. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION, THE MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF

EUTHANASIA 23 (1975) [hereinafter DEATH BY DECISION]. In feudal times, the personal
possessions of one who committed suicide went to his lord. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra §
7.8. Suicide was eventually classified as a felony as a means of enriching the crown,
since personal possessions of a felon would escheat to the state. Id. (citing Hales v.
Petit, I Polwd. 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B. 1565)). For a detailed history of suicide
and assisted suicide as a crime, see Maria T. Celocruz, Aid-in Dying: Should We
Decriminalize Physician-Assisted Suicide and Physician-Committed Euthanasia?, 18
AM. J. L. & MED. 369, 373-77 (1992).
25. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 809, n.39 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
26. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 585 (1957). Generally, such persons were
charged as principals in the second degree. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 82 S.W. 265
(Ky. 1904) (noting that one who provides another with the means to commit suicide is a
principal in the second degree even though he does not actually perform the action
which causes death). See also McMahan v. State, 53 So. 89 (Ala. 1910) (holding that
even though the distinction between first and second degree no longer exists, one who
assists another in a suicide is a principal to the suicide).
27. See, e.g., Hicks, 82 S.W. at 266 (stating that knowingly providing a person with
morphine for the purpose of assisting that person's suicide is murder); State v. Ludwig,
70 Mo. 412 (1879) (a person assisting another in the commission of self-murder was
guilty of first-degree manslaughter), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Fitzgerald, 32 S.W. 1113 (Mo. 1895).
28. Cf. PERKINS, supra note 26, at 586. See also, e.g., Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68
(Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (holding that although directly administering poison to a
willing recipient would indeed be considered murder, supplying a person with poison
used to commit suicide was not criminal as long as suicide itself was not a crime),
overruled on other grounds by Aven v. State, 277 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925).
29. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 24, § 7.8, at 649.
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acceptance of suicide; rather, it was done for practical reasons. 30 An
effective suicide was an unpunishable crime. 3 Failed attempts were
deemed to be the acts of depressed or mentally ill persons, who were
in greater need of psychological attention than criminal punishment.32
However, because suicide was still considered an evil to be
discouraged, many states enacted assisted suicide laws to continue to
punish accessories. 33 Criminal codes of at least thirty-four
jurisdictions classified assisting a suicide either as manslaughter, or as
an independent crime. 34 Even in states which have not enacted a
specific law to punish assisted suicide, the act could still be punished
as a common law subdivision of murder.35 In the history of such
laws, no explicit exceptions were made for physicians who knowingly
helped suffering patients die.36 The role of physicians and medicine,
however, greatly impacted the assisted suicide issue.31
B. The Role of Informed Consent
Traditionally, medicine has been viewed as a paternalistic
profession, where the educated doctor knew best and made most, if
not all, of the decisions related to patient treatment and care.38 In
39
1914, a phrase in the Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital
case dramatically altered the doctor-patient relationship. 4° Writing for
30. Seeid.
3 1. See Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws Banning
Assisted Suicide From the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 771, 775 (1995) (analyzing the constitutionality of laws banning assisted suicide
from the perspective of traditional Catholic teaching).
32. Id.
33. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 24, § 7.8(c), at 651-52.
34. Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Note, Death With Dignity: AIDS and a Call for Legislation
Securing the Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677, 693 nn. 113-15.
(1996) (identifying thirty-four states that have statutory bans, nine that have a common
law prohibition, and only one state, Ohio, that does not punish those who assist in
suicide). The Illinois law is Inducement to Commit Suicide, Act 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12-31. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 24, § 7.8(c), at 651-52.
35. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 24, § 7.8(c), at 651-52; see, e.g., People v.
Roberts 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920), overruled in part by People v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
36. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d. 293, 297 (Mich. Ct. App.) (holding
that the common law ban on assisted suicide still exists and applies to physicians),
vacated and remanded, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
37. See infra Part ll.B.
38. Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent on Pediatric Practice, 95
PEDIATRICS 314, (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Informed Consent, Parental Permission].
39. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
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the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo stated: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.",4' The decision did not
concern a physician who acted without consent, rather one who acted
in contradiction to his patient's explicit wishes.4 2 However, the
decision came to represent that all patients had the right to determine
how they will be medically treated. 43 This principle of selfdetermination included the patients' right to make informed decisions
about their own health care and established two duties for doctors."
The first duty requires doctors to give patients sufficient information to
allow them to make informed, rational health care decisions. 45 The
second duty requires doctors to abide by a patient's wishes.'
Schloendorff represented more than just a redefinition of the
physician's role, it was the basis of a dramatic shift of power from the
doctor to the patient.4 7 Informed consent puts patients in charge of
their medical decisions and shifts the physician's role from
paternalistic decision maker to facilitator of the patient's will.'
C. The Double Effect
Reflecting the belief among doctors that occasionally the obligation
to alleviate suffering should outweigh a mechanical extension of life,
physicians engage in the "double effect., 49 The term double effect
comes from the philosophical principle that an act having two effects,
one good and one bad, is justified when the good outweighs the bad
and the actor's intention is to do good.5 ° In the context of physicianassisted suicide, the double effect describes the practice of knowingly
prescribing a lethal dose of pain killers, if the patient is dying and if the

190 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
4 I. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
42. Id. at 93.
43.

RUTH FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 123 (1986)

(noting that while the Schloendorff decision did not require a doctor to inform his
patient, it is nevertheless widely cited as the foundation of a patient's right to selfdetermination)
44. Id. at 125. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 40, at §§ 18, 32.
45. See FADEN, supra note 43, at 123.
46. Id.
47. See Informed Consent, Parental Permission, supra note 38, at 315.
48. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 40, at 191.
49. See Anthony Fisher, Did God Kill Jesus? The Limits to the Duty of Care, in
THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANASIA 323-24 (John Keown ed., 1995)

50. Id. This principal has its origin in Catholic doctrine, which places primary
importance on the actor's subjective intention to do good. Id.
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primary purpose in administering the drugs is to alleviate pain."'
Usually, though not always, doctors prescribe such medication with
the knowledge and consent of their patient.52 In any event, the
physician plays an active role, professionally assessing the patient's
prognosis and pain level to determine medical options.5 3
D. Dying and the Law: The ConstitutionalRight
To Refuse Medical Treatment
Nancy Cruzan was a high school student who lost control of her car
in early 1983. 54 As a result of the accident, Nancy suffered
tremendous injuries that rendered her unconscious but still able to
breathe.55 At the hospital, Nancy remained in a "persistent vegetative
state," and was kept alive by means of a feeding tube.56 When it
became apparent that Nancy had virtually no chance of recovering her
mental capabilities, Nancy's parents asked that her feeding tubes be
removed. The hospital staff refused.58
Nancy's parents sued, and the case went to the Supreme Court. In
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,59 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the hospital was not required to allow Nancy
to die absent clear evidence that death was her intent.60 The Cruzan
Court recognized that the question of intent essentially belonged to the
state. 6 1 The Court also recognized that Missouri had a legitimate
interest in ensuring that Nancy did not intend to exist in a persistent
vegetative state, attached to machines.62 Although the Court did not
allow Nancy's parents to terminate her life support, it did generally

51. Id.
52. Thomas A. Preston, Physician Involvement in Life-Ending Practices 18 PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 531, 539 (1995) (noting that obtaining consent to a double effect
procedure is complicated by the necessity of performing the act with no intention to
cause death).
5 3. See Dieter Giesen, A Comparative Legal Perspective, in THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
EUTHANASIA 205 (John Keown ed., 1995).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 286; see also id. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 283.
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acknowledge a person's right to refuse treatment.63 The
Court based
64
this right on a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
In a subsequent state court hearing, Nancy's co-workers told a
judge that Nancy said she would not want to live like a vegetable on a
machine. 65 This testimony established the requisite "clear intent," and
a Missouri judge allowed her feeding tube to be removed.66 Nancy
died in 1990, shortly after the release of the Cruzan decision. 67
The Cruzan decision sparked a flurry of state regulations permitting
the withdrawal or refusal of medical treatment. 68 It also helped fuel
debate over the scope of a person's right to die and the conditions
under which a person should be permitted to end her life. 69 Legal
scholars argued that Cruzan raised a question that the decision failed to
answer directly: does the right to die include physician-assisted
suicide?7 °
E. The Illinois Perspective

By the turn of the century, Illinois officially recognized assisting or
promoting a suicide as a common law subdivision of murder.7 In
63. Id. at 278.
64. Id. at 278-79. However the Court also held that this interest must be balanced
against competing state interests. Id. at 279. It is a legitimate state interest to prevent
the erroneous disconnection of life support. Id. at 283. Accordingly, the Court held that
Missouri could require clear evidence of Nancy's intent to die. Id. at 284.
65. Nancy Cruzan Dies, But the Issue Lives On, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1990, at § I.
66. Id.
67. See Robert Stienbrook, Comatose Woman Dies after Artificial Feedings are
Halted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, at A3.
68. See Rita W. Morales, The Twilight Zone of Nancy Beth Cruzan: A Case Study of
Nancy Beth Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 34 How. L.J. 201, 223.
69. See Scott Charton, Court Stops Father from Transferring Ill Daughter,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Dec. 31, 1990, at A2.
70. See John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1172 (1991).
7 1. See Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505 (I11.1903). The defendant, a married man, was
having an affair with a married woman. Id. at 506-07. The woman became despondent
over the prospect of moving back to Tennessee with her husband. Id. at 506-07. The
defendant provided the woman with morphine, which she used to kill herself. Id. at 507.
The court stated:
Though the [defendant] may have known that the deceased intended to kill
herself, and may have even assented to it . . . unless the evidence shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that he did or said something which aided,
encouraged, or induced the deceased to kill herself, he cannot be held guilty of
the charge of murder.
Id. at 511. The defendant's conviction was reversed on a failure of the lower court to
instruct the jury to consider evidence of the defendant's amicable relationship with the
deceased woman. Id. at 511-12.
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1990, the Illinois General Assembly made inducing suicide a crime.72
In response to physicians who were openly helping patients die, the
statute was amended to include assisting a suicide."
As in the rest of the United States, physician-assisted suicide is not
an unusual practice in Illinois.74 Yet, no person has ever been charged
under the inducement to commit suicide statute." In fact, no person
has ever endured criminal consequences for assisting a suicide in
Illinois. 76 A rare prosecution for assisting a77suicide ended under
unusual circumstances in a finding of not guilty.
In that case, Anna Werner, a Chicago resident, suffered from
rheumatoid arthritis. When the pain inflicted by her disease became
72. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). The statute
reads:
(a) A person commits the offense of inducement to commit suicide when he or
she does either of the following:
(1) Coerces another to commit suicide and the other person commits or
attempts to commit suicide as a direct result of the coercion, and he or she
exercises substantial control over the other person through
(i) control of the other person's physical location or circumstances;
(ii) use of psychological pressure; or
(iii) use of actual or ostensible religious, political, social, philosophical
or other principles.
(2) With knowledge that another person intends to commit or attempt to
commit suicide, intentionally
(i) offers and provides the physical means by which another person
commits or attempts to commit suicide, or
(ii) participates in a physical act by which another person commits or
attempts to commit suicide.
For the purposes of this Section, "attempts to commit suicide" means any act
done with the intent to commit suicide and which constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of suicide.
Id.
73. Id.
74. See Siegfried M. Pueschel, M.D., Ethical Considerations in the Life of a Child
with Down Syndrome, 5 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 87, 91 (1989) (stating that in 1961, a
survey of 250 Chicago physicians revealed that 61% admitted knowing of, or
participating in, instances of euthanasia). See infra Part III.A.I for a general discussion
of the prevalence of physician-assisted suicide among doctors.
75. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). See also Tim
Landis, Test of State's Assisted-Suicide Law Looms, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Mar. 18,
1996, at 1. A man who handed a loaded gun to his depressed girlfriend saying "here, do
it" might be the first person charged. Id. To date no charges have been filed.
76. See supra note 71 for a brief discussion of a conviction that was reversed.
77. See Glanville Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 178, 18487 & n.15 (1966) (quoting a portion of the trial transcript of People v. Werner in the
Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, Justice A. L. Marovitz presiding, 1958). This
case involved a husband (rather than a physician) assisting in a suicide of his wife. Id.
78. Id. at 185 n. 15 (noting that the disease incapacitated the victim).

1997]

An Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act

unbearable, Mrs. Werner begged to be relieved of her misery, a
request that Mrs. Werner's husband, Otto, honored. 79 Never denying
what he did, Otto pleaded guilty to manslaughter.80 After hearing
about the sixty-nine year old man's loyalty and affection for his wife,
the trial judge allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. 8' Before
acquitting Mr. Werner, the trial judge stated that "if ...testimony was
[sic] brought out of his devotion and care to his wife in her incurable
illness and of her constant pain and suffering, the jury would not be
inclined to return a verdict of guilty."82
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Modem Crime of Physician-AssistedSuicide
1. The Prevalence of Physician-Assisted Suicide
Although assisting a suicide has always been a crime in the United
States, no American doctor has ever been convicted of providing a
patient with the means to end his or her own life.83 While a lack of
79. Id.
80. Id. at 184 n.15.
81. Id. at 185-86 n.15. In order to determine whether probation might be an
appropriate sentence, Justice Marovitz heard testimony about the Werners' relationship
from their children, their physician and their pastor. Id.
82. Id. at 186 n.15. Justice Marovitz further stated:
Mr. Werner, this is a time in one's life where good reputation and decency over
a span of years pay off. I can't find it in my heart to find you guilty. I am
going to permit you to go home with your daughter and live out the rest of
your life in as much peace as you can find it in your heart to have.
Id.
83. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide:
A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1029 (1982) (noting that as of 1982,
"[n]o published American opinions ... reported convictions of physicians for ...
assisting suicide"); see also Celocruz, supra note 24, at 383 (stating that "Uluries seem
unwilling to convict doctors of assisted suicide . . .even when other citizens are held
criminally responsible for such conduct"). A search of the LEXIS mega library and mega
file consisting of: (DOCTOR OR PHYSICIAN OR (MEDIC! W/2 PRACTICTION!
OR(HEALTH W/2 PROVID!)) W/3 (CONVICT! OR GUILT! OR RESPONSIBL! OR
CHARGE! OR LIABL!) W/3 ((AID.! OR ABET! OR PROMOT! OR ASSIST! OR SOLICIT!
PROCUR!) W/3 (SUICIDE OR DIE OR DEATH OR DYING)) returned only one case. That
decision, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), stated that Michigan's
statute criminalizing assisted suicide was validly enacted under both the Michigan and
the United States Constitutions. Id. at 444-45. On remand, Kevorkian was acquitted of
all charges. Michigan Senate Moves to Ban Assisted Suicides, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,
1994, at A2. Another commentator notes that prior to Kevorkian's activities, only nine
American doctors were ever charged. Michael J. Roth, A FailedStatute, Geoffrey Feiger,
and the Phrenetic Physician: Physician-Assisted Suicide in Michigan and a PatientOriented Alternative, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1994). Similar searches of LEXIS
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guilty verdicts does not mean that these physicians' actions comply
with the law,"a a significant number of doctors use their positions to
provide means for their patients to commit suicide. 5 In one study,
seven percent of respondents acknowledged that they had written
prescriptions for lethal dosages for at least one patient.8 6 Considering
there are over 650,000 doctors licensed to practice in the United
States, this amounts to a substantial number of incidents of physicianassisted suicide. 7 Additionally, an unknown number of doctors who
engage in8 physician-assisted suicide do so more than once during their
8
careers.
Part of the difficulty in determining the prevalence of physicianassisted suicide is that most of the time the practice occurs in secret.8 9
Still, not all physicians assist under cover; some make it a public
affair. 90 In 1991, New York physician Dr. Timothy Quill published
an article in the New England Journal of Medicine describing his
news databases revealed no convictions.
84. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1305-06.
85. See id. (noting that many physicians assist suicides without receiving
Kevorkian's notoriety). See also Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275
JAMA 919, 919-20, 922 (1996) (reporting that 26% of polled physicians had received a
request for physician-assisted suicide and that these physicians wrote lethal
prescriptions for 24% of all requesting patients); Paul Jacobs, Quietly, Doctors Already
Help Terminal Patients Die, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at Al (noting that many doctors
assist in suicide but fear the legal consequences); Andrew H. Malcolm, Giving Death a
Hand: Rending Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1990, at A6 (describing the increasing trend
of quiet physician-assisted suicide).
86. Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in
Oregon, 334 N. ENG. J. MED. 310, 313 (1996). Most surveys on the subject reporting
much higher figures are unreliable in part because the overly-broad way in which the
question is presented fails to confine the results to physician-assisted suicide. See
generally Ezekiel J. Emanual et al., Euthanasia and Physician-AssistedSuicide: Attitudes
and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 THE LANCET
1805 (June 29, 1996) (posing a broad survey question seeking circumstance information
as well as physician-assisted suicide statistics). Still, those higher figures may include
deaths resulting from the double effect. See supra Part II.C.
87. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 121 (115th ed. 1995). The data also shows that the number
of physicians in the United States has increased with every Census, and has doubled
between 1970 and 1993. Id.
88. See, e.g., Dick Lehr, Increasingly, Secretly, Physicians are Helping the hIcurably
Ill to Die, BOSTON GLOBE, April 25, 1993 (City Edition), § Metro/Region, at I
(profiling a doctor who has assisted over 20 patients in suicide); see also Jacobs, supra
note 85, at Al (describing a physician who has participated in physician-assisted
suicide twice).
89. Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1306.
90. Timothy E Quill, Death And Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision Making,
324 N ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
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experience in prescribing a lethal dose of pain killers to a terminally ill
patient. 91 Not only did Dr. Quill "confess" to committing a crime, he
did it in one of the most widely read and well respected medical
journals in the world. 92 Dr. Quill intended to stir discussion, but the
resulting noise was too much for the state of New York to ignore.93
Despite plain evidence that Quill violated both the manslaughter94 and
promotion of attempted suicide statutes," a grand jury refused to
indict. 96 In a disciplinary hearing before the New York Board for
Professional Medical Conduct, members said that, while they could
not condone physician-assisted suicide, Quill's actions were "legal and
ethically appropriate." 97
2. The Role of the American Medical Association
& the Hippocratic Oath
The American Medical Association ("AMA") is officially opposed
to physician-assisted suicide. 9 The AMA views such acts as
antithetical to a doctor's fundamental role as a healer and guardian of
life.99 Many individual doctors agree.' °° Even the Hippocratic Oath
seems to be explicitly opposed to physician-assisted suicide. It states:
91. Id. at 691-94 (describing "Diane," her horrible illness, her strength, and her
difficult decision to elect physician-assisted suicide).
92. Id.
93. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, M.D., DEATH AND DIGNITY 21 (1993). "My intention ... was
to challenge the medical profession to take a more personal, in-depth look at end-of-life
suffering." Id. at 20. Dr. Quill adds: "After the article was published, I received an
unwanted education as to how our legal system both works and doesn't work. ... I
underestimated the extent to which the general public and the legal system would become
interested and involved." Id. at 21.
94. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987) (providing in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when [h]e intentionally causes or
aids another person to commit suicide").
95. Id. § 120.30 (making it a felony to "intentionally causeflor aid[] another person
to attempt suicide").
96. See generally Doctor Who Aided Suicide Cleared of Misconduct, L.A. TIMES
(Bulldog Edition), Aug. 18, 1991, at A32 (noting that the state health board cleared
Quill).
97. Id. (commenting that the board cleared Quill because Quill could not know what
the patient would do with the barbituates he prescribed for her).
98. See Janet Firshein, US Medics Oppose Physician-Assisted Suicide, 348 LANCET
1439, 1439 (November 23, 1996). Despite recent efforts at changing the policy, the
AMA affirmed this position after only ten minutes of debate. A.M.A. Keeps Its Policy
Against Aiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996 (Late Edition), at C9.
99. Jeremy Manier, AMA Affirms Opposition to Assisted Suicide, CHI. TRIB., June
26, 1996, at N6 (stating that the AMA overwhelmingly upheld its opposition to
physician-assisted suicide).
100. Id.
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"I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I
make a suggestion to this effect."''
However, another overarching theme of the oath is the prevention of
suffering. 0 2 Many doctors believe that there are circumstances where
this principle overrides a compulsion to extend life.0 3 In fact, recent
polling data suggests that a majority of Michigan doctors favor
legalizing physician-assisted suicide.' ° Physicians holding this belief
are influenced in part by their experiences with individual patients. 05
0 6
Many have been directly requested to assist a patient in suicide.
Often, when faced with what they considered to be "the right
circumstances," they helped a patient to die.'0 7 Still, doctors are
concerned with the legal repercussions of their actions and most feel
that some form of regulation is needed. 0 8
Ironically, such willingness on the part of doctors to engage in
illegal activity has its roots in a rule of law.' 0 9 The doctrine of
informed consent changed the way physicians practiced medicine.l"°
Under the paternalistic approach, doctors were less likely to assist a

101. GEORGE M. BURNELL, M.D., FINAL CHOICES: To LIVE OR To DIE IN AN AGE OF
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 344 (1993) (quoting L. Edelstien, The Hippocratic Oath: Text,
Translation and Interpretation,in ANCIENT MEDICINE 3-63 (0. Temkin & C. Lillian
Temkin eds., 1967)).
102. See Cheryl K. Smith, What about Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 ISSUES IN LAW
MED. 503, 512 (1993) (noting that the Hippocratic oath, and medicine in general, direct
physicians to eliminate suffering). See also QUILL, supra note 93, at 43 (same).
103. See Roth, supra note 83, at 1418-19 (medical community recognizes the
dilemma physicians face).
104. Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public
Toward Legalizing Physician Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia,334 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 303, 303 (1996) (finding that "most Michigan physicians prefer either the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide or no law at all; fewer than one fifth prefer a
complete ban on the practice").
105. See Lehr, supra note 88, at § Metro/Region, at I.
106. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 920.
107. Id. at 922. "Physicians provided a prescription to 24% (38 of 156) of the
patients who requested physician-assisted suicide, and appeared to consider physical
symptoms and expected survival in these decisions." Id.
108. See Bachman et al., supra note 104, at 303. "When the physicians were given a
wider range of choices, 40 percent preferred legalization, 37 percent preferred 'no law'
(i.e., no government regulation), 17 percent favored prohibition, and 5 percent were
uncertain." Id.
109. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and The Right to Die with Assistance, 105
HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1995). But see Willard C. Shih, Assisted Suicide, The Due
Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation," 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1258 (1995)
(arguing that there is no logical connection).
110. See BURNELL, supra note 101, at 153-54 (arguing that doctors expect patients to
take a more active role in decision-making).
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patient in suicide,' primarily because doctors were unwilling to make
a decision of such gravity for another. 12 Also, under the paternalistic
approach, doctors were less respectful of a patient's opinion about the
best medical course." 3 Over time, the informed consent doctrine
helped to change the attitude of doctors toward physician-assisted
suicide.
3. The Double Effect and the Present Law of
Physician-Assisted Suicide
As a practice, the double effect enjoys broad-based approval from
religious groups, physicians, and euthanasia advocates." 4 Many
commentators also maintain that the practice is generally legal." 5 In
I I1. Cf. WILSON, supra note 24, at 98-99 (illustrating the doctor's dilemma, and
noting that public expectations and the professional oath require the doctor to keep his
patient alive).
112. Cf. id.
113. Cf BURNELL, supra note 101, at 153-54.
114. The origin of Catholic acceptance comes from the writings of Pope Pius XII. He
stated:
If, between the [relief of pain through medication] and the shortening of life,
there exists no direct causal link, imposed either by the intention of the
interested parties or the [circumstances] (as would be the case if the
suppression of the pain could be obtained only by the shortening of life) and
if, on the contrary, the administration of the [medication] produces two
distinct effects, one the relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then
the action is lawful; however it must be determined whether there is a
reasonable proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages
of the one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is also
important to ask . . . whether the present state of science does not make it
possible for the same result to be obtained by other means. Finally, in the use
of the [medication,] one should not go beyond the limits which are actually
necessary.
4 THE POPE SPEAKS 48 (1957) (emphasis added).
A commentator writes: "[a] class of actions can be designated 'double effect
euthanasia.' Theologically and morally it is acceptable for a patient to choose
palliative treatments that may result in death and for a physician to administer
potentially lethal analgesia in the relief of pain." Kenneth L. Vaux, The Theological
Ethics of Euthanasia,in MORAL ISSUES AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSES 360 (Paul T. Jerslid &
Dale A. Johnson eds., 5th ed. 1993). "The administration of a drug necessary to ease the
pain and suffering of a patient who is terminally ill and suffering ... may be appropriate
... even though the effect of the drug may be to shorten life." Decisions Near the End of
Life, 267 JAMA 2229 (1992) (quoting a conclusion of the AMA Council on Ethical &
Judicial Affairs). Dr. Timothy Quill writes that "[a]ccepting the double effect in the care
of the terminally ill has humanized and substantially improved the quality of life before
death for many patients." See QUILL, supra note 93, at 78.
115. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: the Last Bridge to Active
Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 240 (John Keown ed., 1995) (remarking without citation that "[t]he law
contains a number of exceptions ... [and] recognizes the principal of the 'double effect'
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fact, there is no evidence to suggest that the double effect acts as a
common law exception to the crime of assisting a suicide.' 6 It is
widely acknowledged, however, that the double effect is a more or
less routine procedure.'7
B. Regulating Physician-AssistedSuicide Through Legislation
Although only one piece of legislation authorizing physicianassisted suicide has ever been enacted in the United States, bills have
been proposed to legislatures in several states. '
Statutes and
proposed legislation that permit physician-assisted suicide do so by
conferring criminal immunity on the assisting physician. "9 However,
these laws differ in two ways: (1) how they accomplish the result of
allowing physician-assisted suicide; and (2) the limitations and duties
imposed on the various actors.' 20
1. Design and Structure: Varying Means to the Same End
All modem physician-assisted suicide legislation share common
objectives. These objectives include defining the participants, i.e. who
is permitted to assist and who is permitted to die, preserving the legal
status of those involved,' 2' and safeguarding the process. Guiding
these objectives are two essential purposes of physician-assisted
suicide laws: the availability of a safe, dignified, and effective means
to end otherwise untreatable suffering, and protection of a patient's
... .It does so by exempting 'prescribing, dispensing or administering' medication or
treatment designed 'to relieve pain or discomfort and not to cause death, even if the
medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk of death').
116. See infra text accompanying notes 370-75 for an analysis of the common law
treatment of the double effect.
1 17. Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the Hippocratic Oath, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 89 (1993) (noting that the patient's death results from an
acceptable action).
118. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 -.897 (1995)
[hereinafter ODWDA]. This statute faces constitutional challenges that question the
validity of physician-assisted suicide laws generally. See infra Part III.B.2 for a
discussion of the Oregon law and its constitutionality. For an example of a proposed
physician-assisted suicide law, see S.334, Gen. Assembly, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1995).
119. For the purposes of this Comment, "laws" include proposed laws. Most
physician-assisted suicide laws also extend civil immunity to participants. See, e.g.,
H.R. 109, 69th Biennial Sess. § 5293(A) (Vt. 1997).
120. See infra Part III.B.I.
12 1. Aside from granting civil and criminal immunity from liability, physicianassisted suicide laws seek to eliminate any legal complications for patients or their
families. See, e.g., H.R. 1023, 1996 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1996) (citing such a
goal in the statement of purpose). Pay-outs from insurance, the construction of wills
and the dispositions of estates remain unchanged by participation in legalized
physician-assisted suicide: Id.
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basic right of self-determination. 2 2 To accomplish these goals, each23
physician-assisted suicide law also shares common requirements.
Still, physician-assisted suicide laws are not identical: various means
are used to achieve the same basic goals. Generally, the differences
are procedural, but some differences are attributable to nuances among
definitions.
a. The Requesting Patient
One area where requirements can vary greatly is the qualifications
placed on participants, especially the requesting patient. For example,
although all proposed physician-assisted suicide legislation requires a
requesting patient to be diagnosed as "terminal," definitions of this
term differ. 124 Most legislation attaches a time limitation to the
impending death. Of these, nearly all define terminal to mean that the
patient has less than six months to live. 25 A fraction do not consider a
patient's life expectancy in the definition. 126 Another variation

122. See, e.g., id. (stating that the purpose of the act is "to end one's life in a
humane and dignified manner"). See also H.R. 339, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1995) (stating that
"persons have a right, founded in the autonomy of the person, to control the decisions
relating to the rendering of their own medical care" and permitting physician-assisted
suicide for "a patient in a condition of 'severe, unrelenting suffering"'). See also
Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45, 104 (1996); see also supra
notes 39-48 (discussing Justice Cardozo's opinion in Schloendorff).
123. See, e.g., S. 334, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1995) (capsulizing these requirements into
a simple defense to manslaughter). The proposed law provided that:
the general statutes be amended to provide an affirmative defense to
manslaughter in the second degree for physician-assisted suicide if:
the physician is licensed in this state,
the victim made a written request to the physician for the medication which
was self-administered,
the victim was eighteen years of age or older and able to understand the
nature and consequences of such medication and
the victim was deemed to be in terminal condition.
Id.
124. A medical dictionary defines a terminal illness as "an illness that because of its
nature can be expected to cause the patient to die. Usually a chronic disease for which
there is no known cure." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1708 (Clayton L.
Thomas, M.D., M.P.H. ed., 15th ed. 1985). All physician-assisted suicide laws agree
that at a minimum, terminal means that the condition causing the suffering will
eventually result in the patient's death.
125. See, e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § l(n) (Mich. 1995). But see, H.R.
109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997) (defining "terminal" to mean a condition that is
likely to produce death within one year).
126. See Terminally Ill Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 454th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3.8
(Wash. 1995) (requiring only that death will result within a "reasonable period of time,
in accordance with accepted medical standards").
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involves the cause of a patient's impending death.' 27 Some restrict the
cause to mean
a disease. 28 Others use broader terms such as
"condition"'' 29 or "bodily disorder."'' 30 Following the traditional
medical meaning, most laws
also require that a terminal illness be
3
incurable and irreversible. '
The biggest disparities in qualifying a patient are found in the area of
competency. 32 Competency, as it relates to physician-assisted
suicide, can be divided into several aspects. These include adulthood,
the ability to understand and articulate medical decisions, and freedom
from depression or some other mental disorder. 33 Restricting a
request for physician-assisted suicide to competent patients reflects a
long standing legal tenet that only persons who are able to comprehend4
the consequences of a decision should be allowed to make it.'1
Interestingly, while all physician-assisted suicide laws require that the
requesting patient be an adult, not all require that the patients be able to
understand what they request. 35 However, many laws do state that a
requesting patient must have "the ability to make and communicate
health care decisions.' 36 Leaving no room for doubt, one law
127. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text for various definitions of
impending death.
128. See, e.g., Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1996) (defining terminal disease as an incurable and irreversible
disease).
129. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996) (defining terminal
condition as a condition from an accident or disease that will cause death within 6
months).
130. See, e.g., S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996) (defining terminal illness
as a bodily disorder that is likely to cause death within 6 months).
131. See, e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1995). But see S. 2985,
Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996) (defining terminal illness as "a bodily disorder that is likely to
cause a patient's death within six months" and permitting physician-assisted suicide for
any person diagnosed as having either a "terminal illness or from a bodily illness that is
intractable and unbearable"). See supra note 124 for the traditional medical meaning of
terminal illness.
132. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
competing definitions.
133. See H.R. 474, 1996 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996). The law permits a "qualified
patient" to request physician-assisted suicide and defines qualified as having "a mentally
competent adult patient." Id. at § 5.701(J) The law forbids the writing of a lethal
prescription to any patient whose request for physician-assisted suicide was motivated
by depression. Id. at § 5.705(B)(4).
134. Cf. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 23 (1995) (stating that "[t]he parties must be
capable of intelligent assent in order to make a valid contract. Where there is no
capacity to understand or agree, there can be no contract.").
135. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3101(8) (Ariz. 1996) (requiring
that a patient be "competent" without defining what that means.)
136. Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
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provides that "[i]ncapable means [that a patient is] unable to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of health care
decisions, including the administration of aid-in-dying, or unable to
communicate
in any manner whatsoever an informed health care
137
decision."'

A competent patient must also have rational motivations. ,38
Accordingly, many laws require the assisting physician to refer a
patient to a licensed counselor or psychiatrist if he suspects that patient
may be suffering from depression or some other psychological
disorder. 139 If the counselor confirms these suspicions, the physician
is prohibited from assisting the patient. 40 Other laws are more
thorough, requiring psychological evaluations as a matter of course.' 4'
However, not all physician-assisted suicide laws automatically reject 42a
patient who is suffering from depression or mental impairment.
Some do so only when the request is motivated by the psychological
disorder, or when the disorder makes a requesting patient unable to
43
understand his diagnosis or request.1
In order to ensure competency through procedural safeguards,
physician-assisted suicide laws often regulate the timing of events.
The most common of such regulations is a mandatory waiting
period. 44 Generally, statutes prescribe a minimum amount of time a
patient must wait between his first and second requests. 41 Waiting
(Colo. 1996).
137. Physician Aid-In-Dying Act, L.N. 1259, 94th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 1995). This
law authorizes "voluntary active euthanasia," not physician-assisted suicide. Voluntary
active euthanasia ("VAE") is defined as "the deliberate administration of life-shortening
substances with the intention to cause death in order to end pain and suffering." See
Giesen, supra note 53, at 202. Active euthanasia is distinguished from assisted-suicide
in two ways. Id. at 206. First, a person assisting in a suicide does not perform the
immediate act which causes death. Id. Second, a person engaging in active euthanasia
may not be doing so according to the wishes of the patient. Id.
138. See S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-1 (R.I. 1996) (stating that a
purpose of the act is "to ensure that the request for ... assistance is complied with only
when it is ...reasoned").
139. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3105(A) (Ariz. 1996).
140. Id. § 36-3105(B).
141. See S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-5 (R.I. 1996).
142. See H.R. 474, 1995 Leg. Sess. § 5.705(B)(4) (Md. 1996) (forbidding the
writing of a lethal prescription to any patient whose request for physician-assisted
suicide was motivated by depression).
143. Id. (The bill states, "the ...physician shall ... determine that . . . the patient's
request ...was not a result of clinical depression") (emphasis added).
144. See, e.g., Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assy., 2d Reg.
Sess. § 15-18.8-111 (Colo. 1996).
145. See, e.g., id.
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periods are almost exclusively set at fourteen or fifteen days.146 Many
laws also limit the maximum amount of time elapsing between a
patient's second request and the writing of a prescription."'
No
41
timing.
of
issue
the
on
silent
is
law
suicide
physician-assisted
b. The Assisting Physician
In contrast to the many restrictions imposed on the requesting
patient, proposed and existing physician-assisted suicide legislation
places few qualifications on the physician. 49 Most rely solely on state
licensing bodies, and ensure only a minimum medical training. 5 °
Others require the physician to be a specialist in the care of the
dying.' 5 ' Many laws require a special relationship between the
assisting physician and the requesting patient. 5 2 Usually this means
that the physician must have "primary responsibility for the care of the
patient and the treatment of the patient's terminal disease."' 53
Physician-assisted suicide laws are concerned not only with the free
54
choice of patients, but also with the free choice of physicians.
Present in every physician-assisted suicide statute is a section that
specifically allows physicians and health care facilities to refrain from
assisting patients if they choose.'55 However, this can be a qualified
immunity. Washington State, in its proposed law, requires an
146. See, e.g., id. (specifying a fifteen day waiting period). But see Terminally Ill
Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (specifying no
waiting period).
147. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.850 (Supp. 1996) (specifying no longer than
48 hours).
148. See, e.g., Terminally IIIPatient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 1995).
149. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Death with Dignity Act H. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 5902(M) (Me. 1987).
151. See, e.g., Terminally II Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
3.5 (Wash. 1995).(defining the assisting physician as one "who treats dying patients in
the ordinary course of practice and is selected by, or assigned to, the qualified patient
with primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the qualified patient").
152. See, e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § l(b) (Mich. 1995) .
153. Id. See also Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1996) (requiring full or
partial responsibility).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 155-57.
155. See, e.g., S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-11(a) (R.I. 1996). On the
provider's freedom of conscience, the bill provides in pertinent part:
No individual who is conscientiously opposed to providing a patient with
medical means of suicide may be required to do so or to assist a responsible
physician in doing so.
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objecting physician to refer a patient to another doctor. 5 6 Similarly,
hospitals and other health care providers are free to make rules
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide within their facilities, but cannot
otherwise restrict the actions of their doctors or their patients. 157
c. Procedural Safeguards
Proposed and existing physician-assisted suicide legislation
employs a variety of procedural safeguards. 158 These regulations
involve the making and revocation of a valid request and the
disclosures required of physicians. 59 Some of the most extensive
regulation of procedure is found in the rules governing a patient's
request.' 60 Nearly all laws require that a person wishing to die make
one written, witnessed request.16 1 Only one proposed law requires
neither a valid request nor disclosure. 162 In some cases, the definition
of "written" is expanded to include video taping. 163 Many laws also
require two oral requests.' 64 The first accompanies the initial written
request and the second comes immediately before a physician provides
the means to commit suicide. 65 Additionally, a patient may not be
156. Terminally III Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5.3 (Wash.
1995).
157. See, e.g., S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-11(b) (R.I. 1996). On the
provider's freedom of conscience, the Rhode Island Bill continues:
A health care facility that has adopted a policy opposed to providing patients
with medical means of suicide and has given reasonable notice of such policy
to its staff members may prohibit such staff members from providing such
means to a patient who is within its facilities or under its care.
Id.
158. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.
L. & MED. 45, 98 (1995).
159. Thomas S. Ulen, The Law and Economics of the Elderly, 4 ELDER L.J. 99, 118
(1996) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 243 (1995)).
160. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 17-20 (discussing the regulation of a
patient's request under the heading "Conditions to be Met Before a Patient Receives
Assistance in Suicide").
161. See, e.g., Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Reg. Sess. § 15-18.8-109 (Colo. 1996).
162. See, e.g., S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996).
This proposal
nevertheless employs the most extensive requirements for documenting a physician's
disclosures and diagnosis. Id. § 23-4.12-8. It also calls for an administrative board to
review all cases and to promulgate rules as needed. Id. § 23-4.12-9.
163. See, e.g., Terminally II Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
4.3 (Wash. 1995) (allowing video requests).
164. See, e.g., Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Reg. Sess. § 15-18.8-109 (Colo. 1996).
165. See, e.g., id.
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permitted to show any doubts concerning his decision. 166 In some
cases, expressing an "inconsistent intent" between the first and second
requests nullifies both. 67 A patient can always revoke his request for
assistance to suicide. 168 Still, physician-assisted suicide laws vary
greatly in their treatment of revocation. 169 The strictest of laws on this
point provide for a sort of constructive revocation if a patient conveys
any contrary intentions between his first and second requests.,7 0 An
equally conclusive, though more nebulous approach, allows a patient
to rescind his request "at any time and in any manner" by which he or
she is able to communicate an intent to do SO.' 7 ' Other laws use more
precise directions, requiring that the patient make his intentions
clear. 72 In such cases, recission may occur by destroying the written
request or executing a new, written revocation. 73 Most laws also
permit verbal revocation; however, it must be communicated to the
physician
who then confirms the revocation with the requesting
174
patient.

In the area of informed consent, there is more uniformity.175 All
physician-assisted suicide laws require that a patient be advised of his
terminal diagnosis and prognosis. 76 Many also require a physician to
discuss all the potential dangers associated with using the requested
lethal substance. 77 Physicians must inform their patient that if used
166. See, e.g., S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-3(a)(3)(D) (R.I. 1996)
(requiring a request to be "repeated without self-contradiction by the patient on two
separate occasions at least fourteen days apart); see also Death with Dignity Act, H.
4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Mich. 1995) (allowing a patient to revoke a request
"in any manner by which he or she is able to communicate an intent to do so")
(emphasis added).
167. See S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-3(a)(3)(D) (R.I. 1996).
168. See, e.g., S. 5024, 218th Assembly, Ist Reg. Sess. § 4910 (N.Y. 1995).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 170-74.
170. See, e.g., S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-3(a)(3)(D) (R.I. 1996).
171. See S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3103(A)(6) (Ariz. 1996). This law is
based on a model law allowing a patient to make an advance directive authorizing
Voluntary Active Euthanasia, but has been modified here to allow physician-assisted
suicide. See Death with Dignity Act, H.R. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Mich. 1995)
for an example of this format authorizing VAE only. VAE involves the direct
administration of a lethal substance by one person into another who requested it. See
DEREK HUMPHRY, LAWFUL EXIT 12 (1993); BURNELL, supra note 101, at 248.
172. See, e.g., Terminally IlI Patient Act of 1995, S.5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
8.1 (Wash. 1995).
173. See, e.g., id. § 8.1(a)-(b).
174. See, e.g., id. § 8.1(c). The communication need not be direct, thus the need for
confirmation. Id.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 176-84.
176. See, e.g., S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-4(d) (R.I. 1996).
177. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3103(A)(2)(C) (Ariz. 1996).
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properly,
the substance they prescribe will result in that patient's
7
death.
Disclosures are not merely required, but they must also be
documented. 179 Generally, assisting doctors will simply sign an
affidavit acknowledging that they fully informed their patient. 8 ' A
similar acknowledgment is often made by the patient.' One law in
particular puts an extraordinary emphasis on documenting informed
consent.8 2 Specifically, under the Rhode Island proposal, physicians
must record their disclosure on audio or video tape, or document it in a
written record signed by the patient. 8 3 In addition, a witness must
observe the exchange. 18
As an additional precaution against duress and undue influence,
proposed physician-assisted suicide statutes frequently include
85
provisions that remove all questionable incentives from participants.
The most common of these requires persons carrying out duties under
such a law to have no financial relationship to the requesting patient.'86
An exception is allowed for ordinary or reasonable fees. 87 Certain
physician-assisted suicide statutes also forbid the existence of a
88
financial relationship between any of the physicians or counselors.1
Most physician-assisted suicide laws also exclude family members
from participating as either physicians or counselors.' 89 Additionally,
for those requiring a witnessed request, one of the two witnesses must
be unrelated to the requesting patient.' 90 A few laws have no such
safeguards. ''
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See, e.g., id. § 36-3103(A)(2)(D).
See, e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 12 (Mich. 1995).
See, e.g., id. § 6.
See, e.g., id. § 4.
See S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-4 (R.I. 1996).
See, e.g., id. § 23-4.12-4(d)(3)(A).

184.
185.

Id.
See e.g., S.

2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-4(d)(1)

(R.I.

1996)

(prohibiting certain financial relationships); S. 5024, 218th Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
§ 4903(l)(B) (N.Y. 1995) (same); H.R. 339, Reg. Sess. § 137-K:4(Il) (N.H. 1995)
(prohibiting participation of family members in certain roles). See also infra notes

196-203 and accompanying text (discussing legislatively prescribed immunity and
liability as safeguards that act by defining civil and criminal culpability).
186.

See, e.g., S. 5024, 218th Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. § 4903(1)(B) (N.Y. 1995).

187. See, e.g., Terminally III Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
12 (Wash. 1995).
188. See, e.g., id. § 23-4.12-4(d)(1).
189. See, e.g., H.R. 339, Reg. Sess. § 137-K:4(111) (N.H. 1995).
190. See, e.g., id. § 137-K:4(ll)(a).
191. See, e.g., Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Reg. Sess. § 15-18.8-103(2)(B)(1) (Colo. 1996).
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Although their substantive role is limited, family members are not
excluded altogether from the process. 92 A family member, for
example, is not prohibited from acting as a second witness to a
request.193 Additionally, the support and participation of family in the
decision-making process is a concern of many physician-assisted
suicide laws.' 94 However, while all laws authorizing physicianassisted suicide require a physician to ask patients to notify family
members of their decision, family notification itself is not necessary."
d. Immunity and Liability
Another kind of safeguard focuses on defining the boundaries of
liability for acting outside the terms of a given law. These boundaries
establish the limits of civil or criminal culpability. 196 For the purposes
of civil immunity, all statutes allowing physician-assisted suicide
prescribe a standard of care by which a physician or counselor must
act.' 97 Many such laws apply a subjective test, relying on the actor's
own judgment to gauge liability. 98 Less commonly, physicianassisted suicide laws require a physician or counselor to meet the
objective standards of their professions. 99
Although proposed and existing legislation authorizing physicianassisted suicide operate as exceptions to the criminal law, most also
contain their own criminal provisions for non-compliance.2 " Mostly,
these focus on fraudulent breaches of procedure, but sometimes
include special penalties for non-physicians who assist in suicide. 20
192. See, e.g., H.R. 339, Reg. Sess. § 137-K:5(V) (N.H. 1995) (mandating that one
of the duties of the attending physician is to notify "next of kin"); see also id. § 137K:4 (requiring the patient request to be witnessed by at least 2 witnesses, only one of
whom must be a non-family relation-hence, leaving room for family participation).
193. See e.g. H.R. 339, Reg. Sess. § 137-K:4 (N.H. 1995).
194. See e.g., id. § 137-K:5(V) (physician must request that patient notify next of
kin); see also H.R. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 5-904(F) (Me. 1996) (same).
195. See supra note 194.
196. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 23.
197. See, e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 18(a) (Mich. 1995).
198. See Or. Rev. Stat § 127.885 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (providing "no person shall
be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action for
participating in good faith compliance with [this law]"); see also S. 2985, 1996 Leg.,
Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-3 (R.I. 1996) (permitting physicians to assist, when they have an
"honest belief" that the terms of the law are being complied with).
199. See, e.g., Terminally I11Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. §
8.1 (Wash. 1995).
200. See e.g., H.R. 5015, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 19 (Mich. 1995) (making
inducement of suicide without patient request a felony).
201. See e.g., H.R. 1023, Reg. Sess. § 19(1) (Miss. 1996) (setting a maximum term
of thirty years in prison for forging a request for medication); see also Terminally Ill
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Many laws make it a crime to exert duress or undue influence on a
person to encourage them to request assistance to suicide.20 2 Others
simply make reference to that jurisdiction's existing criminal20 3ban on
assisting a suicide, as a catch all for those who don't comply.
2. Enacting Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation:
An End to the Means
Legislative efforts to make assisting suicide legal in the United
States date back to the turn of the century. 2 4 These early efforts
permitted anyone to assist. 20 5 Beginning around 1990, the willingness
of a few doctors to openly assist patients in dying brought national
attention to the issue. 2°6 Since then a number of states have considered
the issue, adding a requirement that a doctor do the assisting. 27 Most
often, these laws were proposed to legislatures, where they met with
decisive defeat.2 °8 More recently, proponents have put the issue
directly to the voters, by placing physician-assisted suicide laws onto
state referenda.20 9 These efforts produced extremely close contests.21°
the
Still, referenda proved no more successful than putting the issue to
21
legislators until the Oregon Death With Dignity Act ("ODWDA"). 1

Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 24 (Wash. 1995) (amending its
law against promoting a suicide attempt to exclude physicians who comply with the
terms of the proposed physician-assisted suicide law).
202. See e.g., H.R. 1023, Reg. Sess. § 19(2) (Miss. 1996).
203. See e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3117(D) (Ariz. 1996)
(specifying no penalties for non-physicians who assist others in suicide, but providing
that "[t]he penalties in this article do not preclude criminal penalties applicable under
any other law for conduct that is inconsistent with this article").
204. DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE 12 (1986). The first such law
was proposed to the Ohio legislature, where it was defeated by a vote of seventy-eight to
twenty-two. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text for an example of one such
physician, Dr. Timothy Quill.
207. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 36-3103(A) (Ariz. 1996) (defining
mandatory duties of an attending physician, hence mandating the assistance of a
physician).
208. See Shih, supra note 109, at 1280.
209. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Hears Two Cases Involving Assisted Suicide, N.Y
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, (Late ed.) at A5. See also Kathy T. Graham, Last Rights: Oregon's
New Death With Dignity Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 601, 601 n.5 (1995). Proposition
161 in California proposed an amendment to the California Penal Code, Section 401
(1992). Initiative 119 in Washington proposed an amendment to Wash. Rev. Code,
Sections 701.122.10-.900. Id. at n.6.
210. See Greenhouse, supra note 209, at A5.
211. ODWDA, supra note 118, § 127.810-.897.
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ODWDA was passed in 1995, attracting just fifty-one percent of the
popular Oregon vote. 2 The law made it legal for physicians to
prescribe a lethal substance to a terminally ill patient at the patient's
request. 1 3 However, before anyone died under the protection of the
act, a group of terminally ill persons challenged the law's
constitutionality in Lee v. Oregon. 214 That group argued in Lee that
the Oregon law violated First Amendment freedoms of association and
exercise of religion, as well as Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of
due process and equal protection. 2 5 Ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the district court in Oregon held that ODWDA violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and
216
permanently enjoined the state from enforcing it.
In Lee, the district court limited its analysis to a "mere rationality"
review.1 Such an examination is the most lenient of equal protection
212. U.S. Judge Keeps Oregon's New Suicide Law in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1994, at 5.
213. ODWDA, supra note 118, §§ 127.800-.897.
214. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1431 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997) (previous opinion amended to include the text of the
ODWDA as an appendix).
2 15. Id. at 1431. In addition to their constitutional challenges, the Lee plaintiffs
alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213,
and further attacked the ODWDA as being "void for vagueness." Id. at 1431, 37. Due to
the district court's determination of the case on equal protection grounds, the statutory
claims were left undecided. Id. at 1431. See also infra note 247 (discussing how the
Ninth Circuit treated the plaintiffs' statutory claims on appeal).
216. Id. (holding the ODWDA unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the
Oregon district attorney from recognizing the constitutionality of the ODWDA and from
recognizing it as an exception to Oregon's criminal law).
217. Id. at 1431 n.2 (stating that review was so limited because plaintiffs did not
argue for application of a heightened or strict scrutiny standard).
When legislation affects certain groups it is analyzed under one of two more stringent
levels of review, "heightened" or "strict" scrutiny. For example, legislation that is
alleged to treat people differently on the basis of sex is analyzed under a "heightened"
scrutiny. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264, 2275 (1996). The "heightened"
scrutiny standard is applied to groups that are sometimes termed "quasi-suspect." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). Legislation that is
alleged to treat people differently on the basis of race is generally analyzed under
"strict" scrutiny because such a classification is said to be "suspect." Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (recognizing that this is the law,
while distinguishing the facts of the case).
The Lee court's application of the mere rationality test is appropriate because the
Supreme Court has held that persons with reduced mental capacity, the group the Lee
decision claims is denied equal protection, are not considered a "suspect" or "quasisuspect" class. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (holding that the mentally retarded are
not a quasi-suspect class). Accordingly, legislation affecting such a group is not
afforded "heightened" or "strict" scrutiny. Id.
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standards, in which legislation is presumed valid if it is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. 2' This is especially true of social
legislation. 2 9 Nevertheless, the court held that the means employed
by the ODWDA were not rationally related to the goal of permitting
assisted suicide.220
Broadly, the court reasoned that the relationship 22' was irrational
because the Oregon law failed to adequately protect all of its citizens,
particularly the incompetent. 222 In essence, the court argued that the
procedures employed by ODWDA were insufficient.223 To illustrate
this point, the court cited a number of examples in which other Oregon
laws impose
more substantial procedures in dealing with incompetent
224
persons.

In its opening, the court discussed Cruzan, the Supreme Court
decision affirming a patient's right to die by refusing medical
treatment.2 5 The court remarked that, while Cruzan recognized an
incompetent person's right to allow "substituted judgment" by third
parties on his behalf, the Oregon law does not.226 Under such a
"safeguard," third parties may act "as proxies to implement what a
patient would choose under particular circumstances. "227
As an example of an even more extensive system of protections the
law provides to incompetent persons, the court cited Oregon's laws
relating to commitment procedures. 228 The court noted that under
these laws, a physician may initiate commitment proceedings for
218. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
219. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431 n.2.
220. Id. at 1437 (stating that "[tihe state interest and the disparate treatment are not
rationally related and [the ODWDA] therefore, violates the Constitution of the United
States").
221. The relationship in question being that between the methods established by the
ODWDA and the state's purpose in permitting assisted suicide.
222. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437 (maintaining that the ODWDA "provides a
means to commit suicide to a severely over-inclusive class who may be competent,
incompetent, unduly influenced or abused by others").
223. Id. at 1434.
224. Id. at 1434-35.
225. Id. at 1434. See supra Part ll.D for a discussion of the Cruzan decision.
226. See Lee, 891 F. Supp at 1434.
227. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990)).
The Lee court relied on Cruzan for the proposition that "a capable adult may designate in
writing a competent adult to serve as attorney-in-fact for health care and to direct
withdrawal of life support." Id. Such a designation is made in advance as a part of a
"living will" and requires the maker to become incompetent before judgment can be
substituted. See Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 45 (1990).
228. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434-35.
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persons he suspects2 29might be "dangerous to themselves" because of a
"mental disorder."
A physician may hold such a person for up to
five days, in anticipation of a judicially supervised examination and
commitment hearing. 230 The court pointed out that "none of these
safeguards applied to [ODWDA]. ''23' The court further explained that
232
not all physicians are trained to evaluate a person's competence.
Not only might a doctor fail to recognize a condition such as
depression, he might unwittingly encourage a compulsion to
suicide.233 The danger is especially great, the court stated, because
depressed persons are unusually malleable and a physician, not
recognizing the condition, might reinforce feelings of unworthiness by
suggesting physician-assisted suicide.234 Another weakness of the
Oregon law, the court revealed, is found in the law's definition of
"terminal. 235 The court intimated that the six month restriction
presents no meaningful boundaries, legal or otherwise. 236
The court also criticized the Oregon law for failing to require that a
requesting patient consult with a social worker to determine whether
services exist that might alleviate discomfort.2 37 This responsibility,
the court noted disapprovingly, rests solely with the assisting
physician.238
Another, deeper flaw revealed by the court was the physician's
standard of care defined by ODWDA. In all other circumstances,
Oregon requires that physicians "use that degree of care, skill and
diligence which is used by ordinarily careful physicians.., in similar
circumstances. ... ,,239 The court, however, observed that under the
ODWDA, a subjective, "good faith" standard applies.240 In one of
229. Id. at 1434 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.005(l)(d)(A), 426.070 (1993 &
Supp. 1996)).
230. Id. at 1434-35 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.23!1, 426.070, 426.110, 426.120
(1993 & Supp. 1996)).
231. Id. at 1435. The court added that "there is no independent oversight for the
decision and implementation of an assisted suicide request by medical professionals,
i.e., review by a probate court, as there is with civil commitment." Id. at 1436.
232. Id. at 1435.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Section 127.800 of the ODWDA defines "terminal disease [as] an incurable
and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months." ODWDA, supra note 118, §
127.800.
236. See Lee, 891 F. Supp at 1432-33 n.3.
237. Id. at 1435.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1436 (quoting OR. REV STAT. 677.095 (1993 & Supp. 1996)).
240. Id.
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only two applications of the mere rationality test, the court concluded
that this defect annulled any rational relation between the Oregon law
" '
and its goal.24
In the other application of the mere rationality test, the court
commented that "[t]here is no set of facts under which it would be
rational to conclude that a state may sanction providing people the
means to commit suicide without consideration of their circumstances
'
at the time of the suicide."242
The court rested this conclusion on the
fact that there is no confirmation of a patient's competence at the
critical moment when he decides to end his life. 4 ' The court
concluded that the relationship between the Oregon law's classification
and the goal of permitting physician-assisted suicide "is too attenuated
without some protection at the time of taking the fatal drug dosage." 2 "
Without deciding whether the ODWDA violates the Equal Protection
24
Clause of the United States Constitution,
the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court in Lee. 246 The unanimous court
held that none of the plaintiffs had standing247 to challenge the
ODWDA, and that certain claims were not sufficiently ripe.24 ' The
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court decision, and instructed that
court to dismiss the case.249
241. Id. at 1437. Specifically, the court concluded "that there is no set of facts under
which it would be rational for terminally ill persons under [ODWDA] to receive a
standard of care from their physicians under which it did not matter whether they acted
with objective reasonableness, according to professional standards." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Nor did the court decide whether any other substantive claims raised by the Lee
plaintiffs were violated. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
246. Lee v. Oregon, No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5429, at *24 (9th Cir.
March 21, 1997).
247. The Ninth Circuit in Lee ruled that none of the plaintiffs could allege an "injury
in fact" sufficient to sustain either the equal protection or American with Disabilities Act
claims. Id. at *18. This deficiency also precluded the plaintiffs from succeeding on
claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1973), and the Religious
Freedom & Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993). Id. at
*18, *22, *24. Furthermore, the court ruled that the plaintiff-physicians could not
bring an action on behalf of their patients that the patients had no standing to bring
themselves. Id. at *17. Nor did the plaintiff-physicians have standing to assert a claim
under the First Amendment or RFRA. Id. at *22, *24.
248. The First Amendment and RFRA claims by plaintiff-physicians, suggesting that
the ODWDA would require them to participate in activities that conflict with their
religious beliefs, were rejected on ripeness grounds. Id. at *23. The court noted that the
plaintiff-physicians did not identify a "hardship that would befall them if their claims
were not considered at this time." Id.
249. Id. at *24. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' claims suffered from "both
standing and ripeness defects." Id. at *23. The court concluded that federal courts,
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C. Authorizing Physician-AssistedSuicide Through the Courts
1. The United States-A Constitutional Right
to Physician-Assisted Suicide
If a terminally ill person has a right to die by refusing "extraordinary
medical treatment," does that right comprehend physician-assisted
suicide? In 1995, a group of physicians and terminally ill patients
challenged Washington State's criminal ban250 on assisting a
suicide. 5' The physicians properly had standing in the case because
they wished to assist patients in suicide but felt endangered by the
Washington statute.252 The district court ruled that the criminal statute
violated the privacy and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.253 This decision was
254
reversed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, an en banc rehearing of the case, the Ninth Circuit reversed its prior decision,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment included a right to die.255
Shortly after the Compassion in Dying decision, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals announced its decision on an identical issue. 5 6 In
Quill v. Vacco, the court held that the New York criminal ban on
assisted suicide was unconstitutional as applied on equal protection
grounds. 57 The court reasoned that since a patient had a right to
refuse life support and other extraordinary means, it was unlawful to
deny other terminally ill patients assistance in ending their lives. 8
therefore, do not have Article III jurisdiction over the claims. Id. at *24.
250. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1995).
25 1. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (statute criminalizing assisted suicide violates Equal Protection Clause), rev'd, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (statute does not deprive anyone of constitutionally protected
liberty interest), rehearing en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (statute violates equal
protection), cert. grantedby Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). See also
U.S. Judge Keeps Oregon's New Suicide Law in Limbo, supra note 212, at A5.
252. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 795-96 (rehearing en banc affirming the
district court's ruling on standing).
253. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
254. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
255. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793 (concluding "that there is a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's
own death").
256. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted by Washington v.
Glucksberg 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996). "Quill" is Dr. Timothy Quill. See supra notes 91-97
and accompanying text for a discussion of Dr. Quill.
257. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727.
258. Id. at 729.
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However, the court specifically rejected the existence of a Fourteenth
Amendment right to assisted suicide. 259
As the case law suggests, there is little consensus about the
constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide. 2' However, there is an
end in sight to some of the confusion. The Supreme Court has agreed
to jointly review Compassion in Dying and Quill v. Vacco. 2 6 ' This
decision promises to resolve whether a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide exists.262 However, this decision will leave
unanswered the question of whether laws such as the Oregon Death
With Dignity Act are constitutional.263
2. International Case Law
In the Netherlands, physician-assisted suicide has enjoyed a kind of
quasi-legal status for a number of years. 264 Although the Dutch penal
code prohibits euthanasia, a judicially-created exception exists for
physician-assisted suicide arising under a defense of necessity.265
This exception was established in the Schoonheim decision, a criminal
proceeding against a doctor who helped a patient end her life. 266 In
response to a patient's request, Dr. Schoonheim injected her with a
lethal combination of drugs. 267 At trial, Dr. Schoonheim pleaded a
defense of necessity, claiming he had conflicting legal obligations. 26 8
In finding the defendant doctor not guilty, the Dutch Supreme Court
explained that the doctor's duty is not limited to following the criminal
code; according to the court, the doctor is also legally constrained to
259. Id. at 724-25.
260. Lee, Compassion in Dying, and Quill all contradict each other to some degree.
Unfortunately, Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health does not clearly dispose of the issue.
261. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (granting certiorari).
262. See Greenhouse, supra note 209, at Al.
263. Simply because there is no constitutional right to engage in physician-assisted
suicide does not mean that the right cannot be created by statute. Even traditionally
criminal behavior may be permitted, though there is no "Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process" right to engage in such. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
195 (1986), for example, the Court ruled that there is no substantive due process right to
engage in sodomy. Id. Nevertheless, the practice is permitted in over one half of all
states. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1732 (1993).
264. See Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 261 (John Keown
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Euthanasia in the Netherlands].
265. Id.
266. See BURNELL, supra note 101, at 264-65.
267. Id.
268. For a discussion of the Schoonheim case, see Julia Belian, Comment, Deference
to Doctors in Dutch EuthanasiaLaw, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 255, 267-70 (1996).
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act within the current standards of medical ethics.269 Current medical
ethical standards, the court added, included consideration of a patient's
interest in ending his life under certain circumstances. 2 0 Thus, the
doctor indeed faced conflicting legal responsibilities, and could not
acknowledge one without violating the other.27' The Dutch Supreme
Court reasoned that these conflicting interests must be balanced against
each other and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
do so. 272 Deciding that Dr. Schoonheim had indeed acted within
current medical ethical guidelines, the trial court acquitted him.273
The effect of the Schoonheim decision was to give doctors the
power to decide if and when a patient could legally be put to death. 4
More importantly, it allowed doctors to actively administer lethal doses
of medicine.275 While most Dutch patients choose death under the
protection of the necessity exception to the law criminalizing
euthanasia, it has been estimated that at least 0.8% of all Dutch citizens
die from "euthanasias" performed on them without their explicit
276 One publicized example involved the "euthanizing" of an
request. 27
infant with spina bifida and hydrocephalus.277 Nevertheless,
authorities in the Netherlands continue to express satisfaction with
their system, stating that "the medical actions and decision process
concerning the end of life are of high quality." 8

269. See BURNELL, supra note 101, at 264.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Euthanasia in the Netherlands, supra note 264, at 282.
275. Id. at 264.
276. Id. at 269 (citing results of the Van der Maas Survey, undertaken by the
Reemelink Commission in 1990 and published in Dutch in 1991). These acts were
admittedly intended to hasten the death of the patient. Id. In addition, approximately
17% (22,500/130,000) of Dutch euthanasias were performed by giving suffering
patients an overdose of pain killers, the identical actions taken by doctors who practice
the double effect in the United States. Id. Of these, 12% (14,625/130,000) were
performed with the intention only to alleviate pain, the theoretical definition of the
double effect in the United States. Id. Another 5% (6,750/130,000) were performed
only partly with the intent to kill, and an additional 2% (1,350/130,000) were done
explicitly so that the patient would die. Id.
277. See World News Briefing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 19, 1994, at 19A.
278. See Euthanasiain the Netherlands, supra note 264, at 282 (citation omitted).
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Constitutionalityof Physician-AssistedSuicide
Lee v. Oregon is the first step toward what will undoubtedly be a
long path of litigation over the constitutionality of laws authorizing
physician-assisted suicide.2 1 9 Although it is a trial level decision, the
district court in Lee raises a legitimate question about whether a law
authorizing physician-assisted suicide can withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 280 At present, that question must remain unanswered since
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to
resolve the Lee dispute. 28' However, in a different decision, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated (en banc) that "[t]he [Lee v.
Oregon] reasoning conflicts squarely with the reasoning of this
opinion and with the legal conclusions we have reached. 282 A
Supreme Court determination of this conflict is expected to be issued
in the summer of 1997.283

It is uncertain whether the controversy in Lee v. Oregon will
ultimately reach the Supreme Court. However, if a future reviewing
court supports the district court's application of mere rationality and its
conclusion in Lee that the Oregon statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, then this would clearly represent a new understanding of
the mere rationality test.284 Only a few statutes have ever failed this
279. See, e.g., Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Or. 1995), vacated and remanded,
107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5429 (9th
Cir. March 21, 1997).
280. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The Constitutional Case Against
Permitting Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal
Conditions," 11 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 239 (1995).

See also Stephen K. Bushong &

Thomas A. Balmer, Breathing Life into the Right to Die: Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act, 11 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 269 (1995) (for an in-depth review of the constitutionality
of the ODWDA).
28 1. See Lee v. Oregon, No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5429, at *24 (9th
Cir. March 21, 1997) (holding that "federal courts do not have Article III jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's claims ....
Accordingly we vacate . . . and remand with instructions to
dismiss . . . for lack of jurisdiction"). See also supra text accompanying notes 245-49
(discussing the Ninth Circuit decision to vacate).
282. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
283. See Joan Beck, Wrestling with Physician-Assisted Suicide, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9,
1997, at N25. See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) (granting
certiorari).
284. See generally Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (applying the
mere rationality standard to Oregon's statute criminalizing assisted suicide, and
nevertheless finding that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997). See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
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standard of review.285 This broadly deferential standard is meant to
create a solid presumption that a law will withstand constitutional
challenge.286 Indeed, it is likely (assuming that the jurisdictional
questions in Lee did not require a reversal) that the Ninth Circuit
would still have vacated the district court's finding that the statute
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment, since the district court
misapplied the mere rationality test. 287 The district court directly
applied the mere rationality standard in two instances in Lee, 28 erring
in both applications.
The district court's first direct application of the test involved
analysis of the subjective "good faith" standard employed by the
Oregon law. 289 Failing to provide a requesting patient with a
safeguard available to him during all other dealings with his physician
is a mistake. 290 However, although the court made an excellent point
regarding the inexplicable use of this standard,29 ' it is not a
constitutional error.292 By definition, most physicians conduct
themselves according to the ordinary, reasonable standards of their
profession. 293 Every circumstance in which a doctor legally assists a
competent patient in suicide, while meeting the reasonable standards of
his profession, is a set of facts under which it would be rational to do
SO.294 This is true regardless of whether he is so required by statute.
285. See D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of
Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 67, 73 n.29 (1993).
286. Id.
287. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 16.
288. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1432-37.
289. Lee, 891 F.Supp. at 1436-37.
290. Id. at 1437.
291. See id.
292. See Bushong & Balmer, supra note 280, at 277-78. See also Baron et al., supra
note 153, at 14, 19-20 (concluding that the district court in Lee incorrectly found the
ODWDA unconstitutional and advocating a subjective standard for physicians who
participate in physician-assisted suicide).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1997). "[Olne who undertakes to
render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and
knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing
in similar communities." Id.
294. But see Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437 (stating that "[t]he state interest and the
disparate treatment [between competent and incompetent patients] are not rationally
related"). In other words, because the ODWDA fails to protect incompetent persons in
all circumstances, it cannot rationally support the state goal of allowing competent
persons to choose physician-assisted suicide. Id. (stating "[the ODWDA] provides a
means to commit suicide to a severely over-inclusive class who may be competent,
incompetent, [or] unduly influenced"). However, the law requires that there be no set of
circumstances under which the relationship would be rational. Id. Thus, to support this
conclusion, the court must decide that no rational (competent) person would choose
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The mere rationality test does not render a law unconstitutional on the
mere possibility that something will go wrong. 5 On the contrary, a
law must be upheld
if there is a set of facts under which it would be
296
rational to do SO.
In its second application of the mere rationality test, the district court
in Lee discussed how there is no assurance that the requesting patient
is competent at the time he uses his fatal prescription.29 7 As the court
suggested, it could be months before the prescription is used. 298 Of
course, this presents the danger that once he receives his prescription,
a requesting patient may become incompetent or suffer duress.
Indeed, the Lee court identified a hypothetical circumstance under
which the law would fail to prevent an incompetent person from using
a lethal prescription. 2 " This argument fails, however, since the court
misapplied the mere rationality test.3 °° The rule is not that a
classification must be upheld unless there is any conceivable set of
facts that could provide no rational basis for the classification. 30 The
test is "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification," the law must be
upheld.30 2 In fact, an instance where a patient would become
incompetent before using his prescription surely would be the
exception to the rule.30 3 A more likely set of facts provides a rational
basis for classification. For example, a patient is screened for
competency when he receives a prescription.3° Some patients will use
their prescriptions within one week, most without succumbing to
incompetence.3 5 Interestingly, in a survey of physicians illegally
physician-assisted suicide. In so doing, one judge must decide that 618,751 Oregon
voters made an irrational, and therefore unconstitutional, decision. See Lee, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5429, at *2.
295. See Lee, 891 F. Supp at 1432 (stating "[a] classification must be upheld against
an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification" (quoting FCC v. Beach
Communications, 113 S. Ct 2096, 2100 (1993))).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1437.
298. Id.
299. Id. (hypothesizing that a patient might become incompetent within hours,
days, weeks or months of obtaining his prescription).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 295-96.
301. Cf. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
302. Id. at 1432 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2100
(1993) (emphasis added)).
303. See supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
304. See ODWDA, supra note 118, § 127.830 (requiring a physician to confirm that a
patient is making an informed request before writing the prescription).
305. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 922. One author, discussing competence in
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providing physician-assisted suicide, thirty-nine percent of patients
prescribed a lethal substance did not use it.3° 6 Knowing that
physician-assisted suicide was illegal, these patients put themselves
and their doctors at risk in order to obtain the prescription, only to
refrain from using it to end their lives. 307 The peace that many were
searching for was the freedom from fear of an indeterminate but
excruciating death, and the opportunity to control the end of their
lives. 30 8 An arbitrary time limit could compel some to use the lethal
prescription when they might not otherwise do so.
The remainder of the court's criticisms of the ODWDA are not part
of its holding. 3 9 Nevertheless, the court raises some interesting
points.310 Beginning its analysis of the ODWDA, the court refers to
substituted judgment.31 ' Substituted judgment is used when the
patient is already determined to be incompetent.312 For instance, in
Cruzan, it was used to allow a family member of an unconscious
patient to "substitute [the family member's] judgment" for that of the
patient, allowing the life support to be removed.313 The analogy is
inappropriate to this context, however, because it would allow third
parties to substitute their judgment for that of the incompetent patient,
giving that third party the power to determine whether the incompetent
patient should end his life through suicide. This is a calamity the act
specifically seeks to avoid.314 If, however, the court intends to allow
substituted judgment in the context of physician-assisted suicide, then

terms of making a living will, writes "[t]he law presumes an individual is competent
unless legally determined otherwise." Lester J. Perling, Comment, Health Care Advance
Directives: Implicationsfor Florida Mental Health Patients,48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193,

195 n. 13 (1993). Speaking abstractly about legal competency, Mr. Perling posits that
it may make no difference that a person becomes incompetent after making a decision to
undergo a particular medical treatment. Id. See also Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Aspects
of the Dementias, 349 THE LANCET 948, 948 (1997) (noting that "[wlhen patients are
found to have become mentally disordered, their former wishes cannot simply be ignored
or discounted").
306. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 922.
307. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 922 (noting that the patients did not use the
prescription).
308. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 13, 104-05.
309. See generally Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997).
310. See generally id.
311. Id. at 1434.
312. See Harmon, supra note 227, at 53 n.238.
313. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990).
314. See ODWDA, supra note 118, § 127.825.
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the argument fails because the analogy is irrelevant. An incompetent
31
person is not permitted to end his life under the act.

The court correctly criticizes the Oregon act for not requiring a
counseling referral to rule out depression as the cause of a patient's
request. 16 Many physicians may not be trained to adequately identify
such a situation. 17 It is interesting, however, that the court also cites
section 426.231 of the Oregon Revised Statutes as an example of a

safeguard not available under the ODWDA.318 This section authorizes
a physician to begin commitment proceedings for any person whom
the physician suspects may be suffering from a mental defect.3 19 In
the physician-assisted suicide context, however, a physician who
suspects the same of a requesting patient is obliged not to assist him in
ending his life. 320 Thus, there is no need for the extensive hearings
and procedures the cited laws entail, unless a person must
affirmatively prove competency before he is permitted to request
assistance in suicide. 32 1 Requiring such procedures would only be
reasonable if it is assumed that all persons who request physicianassisted suicide are dangerous to themselves because of a mental
defect. 322 Judge Hogan intimates as much in a footnote. 323 Such an
argument might state good policy against physician-assisted suicide
laws in general, but it is irrelevant to an equal protection argument.324
Additionally, the court forcefully argued that physicians may not be
adequately versed in the area of comfort care.325 However, following
315. Id.
316. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435 (the court noted that failure of the ODWDA to
mandate second opinions results in a failure to assure that patients are "qualified" under
the act). See also Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to
Die-Reality and Myth, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1101-02 (1991) (noting that
"primary care physicians often fail to recognize treatable depression"). Cf Baron et al.,
supra note 153, at 29 (requiring referral to a licensed psychiatrist, clinical psychologist,
or psychiatric social worker).
317. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435 (noting the difficulty, even for experts, to
determine depression). See also Conwell & Caine, supra note 316.
318. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434-35. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 426.231 (West
1996).
319. Id.
320. See ODWDA, supra note 118, at § 127.825.
321. See OR. REV. STAT. § 426.231.
322. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434 n.6 (stating that "[iut is ... 'rational' to conclude
that a person could never receive a benefit from self-destruction").
323. See id.
324. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 16 (noting that "Judge Hogan appears to
have applied his own version of rational review and struck down the Oregon Act because
it was not as rational as he thought it should have been").
325. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1435; see QUILL, supra note 93, at 102.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

the court's suggestion of requiring mandatory consultation with a
social worker would add needless red tape.326 A better approach
would be to require that one of the physicians be a specialist in comfort
care, hospice care or the care of the dying.327
B. Prohibitionsof Physician-AssistedSuicide:
When is a Crime not a Crime?
Undoubtedly, the lack of criminal consequences for doctors who
participate in physician-assisted suicide is due in part to the fact that it
is done in secrecy.328 Doctors have plenty of incentives to keep such
procedures hidden 329 and have little difficulty in doing so. 330 It is not
unusual to treat patients using large quantities of potentially lethal
medication.33' When the medication is given to allow a person to end
his own life, the physician need only record the patient's cause of
death as the terminal disease and the case is closed.33 2 Many such
cases could be discovered with a minimum amount of investigation.333
However, this does not occur because there is little public will to
investigate and prosecute such offenses.334 In essence, the practice
enjoys tacit legal approval, as long as physicians keep it quiet.335

326. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 102.
327. See id.
328. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1306; see also Malcolm, supra note 85, at A6.
329. Doctors face the possibility of criminal sanctions and of losing their license.
See QUILL, supra note 93, at 22. Doctors also worry for the families of the patient. Id. at
20. Families, for example, face potential criminal charges, an unwanted autopsy,
potential insurance, pension and probate difficulties, and other unwanted scrutiny at an
already difficult time. See id. at 22, 174. See also Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-And-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1872 (1995) (noting that "most insurance policies exclude
coverage for death by suicide within the first one or two years of the commencement of
coverage").
330. See Lehr, supra note 88, at 1.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. The profiled doctor explained:
I mean, if you were the feds and wanted to look at my morphine
prescriptions-that's all FDA-recorded-and you wanted to correlate that with
obituaries, and you found out that.... I wrote six prescriptions for escalating
morphine concentrations and ... this woman died, you could call me up and
say, "Well, what's going on here?"
Id.
334. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1297-99.
335. Id.
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But even celebrated cases go unpunished.336 In Michigan, Dr.
Kevorkian has been prosecuted five times.
Yet, in spite of
admitting to assisting his patients in suicide, he has not been
convicted.338 Similarly, while the public in New York apparently
supports maintaining its criminal prohibition on assisted suicide, it
ignores irrefutable evidence of the crime, refusing to indict Dr.
Quill. 339 State licensing authorities treated Dr. Quill's case in a
schizophrenic manner, verbally denouncing his actions while refusing
to take official action. 3 4 After deciding not to sanction Dr. Quill, the
licensing board stated that "[ulitimately, these are decisions left to the
patients., 34' The potential loss to Dr. Quill was great-he faced the
prospect of losing his license 342 and spending fifteen years in
prison.343 Such dire consequences imply a heinous crime. Yet despite
freely acknowledging his actions, Dr. Quill received no punishment.34
It is a strange dichotomy that criminalizing physician-assisted
suicide enjoys strong enough support that new prohibitions continue to
be enacted,345 yet, repeatedly and predictably, prosecutors are unable,
or unwilling, to convict.3 6 The AMA takes only ten minutes to reject
a proposal to embrace physician-assisted suicide, yet a majority of
doctors would allow the practice.347 It is easy to oppose physician336. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97 (discussing the case involving Dr.
Timothy Quill).
337. A Prosecutor Drops Kevorkian Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at A20.
338. Id. The prosecutor noted that trying Kevorkian would be "an exercise in
futility." Id.
339. See Doctor Who Aided Suicide Cleared of Misconduct, supra note 96, at A32.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Greg Livadas & Mitch McKenney, No Charges Will be Filed Against Doctor
in Suicide, GANNETT NEWS SERV., July 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, News library,
Curnws file.
343. See Doctor Who Aided Suicide Cleared of Misconduct, supra note 96, at A32.
344. In a sense Dr. Quill could dispute this and he would be correct. See B.D. Colen,
It Wasn't a Crime; No charges for M.D. Who Aided Dying Patient's Suicide, NEWSDAY,
July 27, 1991, at 5. The processes Dr. Quill endured in defending himself against both
actions were physically, emotionally, and financially draining. Id. This author
believes it is appropriate to question the wisdom and fairness of subjecting physicians
to such procedural punishment when the systems involved refuse to officially punish.
345. A law criminalizing assisting a suicide was enacted in Rhode Island in 1996.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1 (1996).
346. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1297-98.
347. See A.M.A. Keeps Its Policy Against Aiding Suicide, supra note 98, at C9. See
also Bachman et al., supra note 104, at 303 (finding that 56% of physicians favored
legalizing physician-assisted suicide over an explicit ban, and that given more choices,
40% favored legalization, while 37% favored no law on the subject, while only 17%
favored prohibition).
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assisted suicide in a general way.348 When organized in groups and
confronted with the subject in the abstract, people tend to think it is a
bad idea. 349 However, when confronted with individual stories about
real people, opinions shift toward allowing the practice." 0 When
asked whether physician-assisted suicide should be made legal, the
legislature in New York said no.351 However, when asked if Dr. Quill
should be indicted, the people of New York said no.352
C. Prohibitionsof Physician-AssistedSuicide
and the Double Effect
The philosophy of the double effect does not lend itself well to
wholesale application in the criminal law.353 The criminal law favors
punishing for intent over punishing for effect. 354 This is because the
traditional elements of a criminal offense are a guilty act (actus reas)
and a guilty mind (mens rea). 355 Behavior that includes both but lacks
the expected result
is still criminal, usually criminal attempt of the
356
expected result.

357
Despite its name, the double effect focuses primarily on intent.
According to the philosophy, one is only responsible for the results
that he intends, and not those he merely foresees. 3 8 However, there
is an important difference between intent in the criminal law and intent
in the double effect: measurability.35 9 In criminal law, a person who
348. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 98-101 (discussing the Hippocratic
oath and the AMA's stated opposition to physician-assisted suicide).
349. See Bachman et al., supra note 104, at 303.
350. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1292-98.
35 1. See John Machacek, Justices Appear Wary of Granting Right to PhysicianAssisted Suicide, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Jan. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News library,
Curnws file.
352. See Doctor Who Aided Suicide Cleared of Misconduct, supra note 96, at A32.
353. See generally supra text accompanying notes 49-53 and 114-17 (discussing
double effect).
354. At common law all crimes required some kind of "fault" or intent to bring about
the prohibited result. See LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 24, § 3.8, at 242.
355. See Rebecca Frank Dallet, Note, Foucha v. Louisiana: The Danger of
Commitment Based on Dangerousness, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157 (1993).
356. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 24, § 6.2, at 495. For example, if John aims a
gun at another with the intent to kill him, pulls the trigger but misses, he is guilty of the
crime of attempted murder in Illinois. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-4 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1996).
357. See generally John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 25-30 (John Keown
ed., 1995).
358. Id.
359. See infra notes 362-66 (noting the difficulty in determining subjective intent
(the standard for the double effect), compared to objective intent (the standard for
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commits a proscribed act and who is proven to have had the intent to
do so will be found guilty.3 60 This is a strong disincentive to be
honest or forthcoming about one's intent. In addition, the
constitutional right against self-incrimination protects those who
commit crimes from having to reveal their true intentions. 36' To
account for this, the law allows a fact finder to determine criminal
intent through an objective look at the circumstances.362 To illustrate,
if John tells a person to "say your prayers," and then throws a bottle at
him, a fact finder may decide that John attempted murder.3 63 John is
not automatically exonerated by claiming that his true intent was for the
person to pray. 64 On the other hand, the double effect focuses on a
person's actual, subjective intent.3 65 At trial, if John claimed that
subjectively, he only wanted the other to pray, he would still go to jaileven though under the double effect he is innocent.
In Illinois, John has another problem. A person is guilty of murder
when he performs an act and knows that the act creates a strong
probability that another will die.367 Imagine John as a doctor, caring
for a terminally ill patient. If John gives that patient a lethal dose of
morphine, knowing it will kill him, but wishing only to eliminate his

criminal law), which may be proven by circumstantial evidence)
360. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 24, § 3.4, at 212.
361. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
362. See People v. Koshiol, 262 N.E.2d 446, 449 (111.
1970) (holding that "intent is
a state of mind, and, if not admitted, [it] can be shown by surrounding circumstances"),
overruled on other grounds by People v. Nunn, 304 N.E.2d 81 (111. 1973) (defendant's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure violated when police
conducted warrantless search).
363. See People v. Tye, 565 N.E.2d 931, 938 (I11.
1990) (the fact finder need not
ignore circumstantial evidence of severe child beating in deciding that the defendant had
the requisite mental state for murder, even though the defendant stated he intended only
to discipline his child).
364. Id.
365. See Finnis, supra note 357, at 27.
366. Id. Finnis argues that while a person who "choos[es] to kill someone with drugs
(administered over . . . three days in order not to arouse suspicion) in order to relieve
them of their pain and suffering" is guilty of murder, he is not legally responsible for
murder (because of the double effect) if he "chooses to relieve someone of their pain by
giving drugs . . . foreseeing that the drugs in that dosage will cause death in .. . three
days." Id. The law suggests a less expansive view of the double effect, permitting a fact
finder to equate such knowledge with criminal intent. See HUMPHREY & WICKETr, supra
note 204, at 17-18 (reporting a manslaughter conviction for a man who "chloroformed"
his son in order to "end my boy's misery").
367. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Ch. 5/9-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
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patient's pain, John is still guilty of murder.36 He is guilty in spite of
his intention to do good.369
As a common law defense, the double effect does not absolve a
person of criminal liability.37 ° This is true in spite of a person's
subjective intent to do good.37' Still, the philosophy of the double
effect enjoys some support in the law. 37 2 Discussing whether a
surprise price increase constituted bad faith during a contract
negotiation, Judge Posner writes that:

368. See People v. Cardona, 634 N.E.2d 720, 723 (II1. 1994) (distinguishing
between the mental state necessary to sustain a murder conviction, including
intentionally causing death, and performing acts that create a strong probability of
death).
369. See People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796 (N.Y. 1909). The
court in Hegeman stated:
[lit is the knowledge or belief of the actor at the time that stamps identically
the same intent as either criminal or innocent, for the intent to take life,
unless under circumstances that the law regards as sufficient to justify the
taking, is the criminal intent and the only criminal intent that can exist in
case of murder (excepting where the killing is done in the commission of an
independent felony). So, ordinarily, a criminal intent is an intent to do
knowingly and willfully that which is condemned as wrong by the law and
common morality of the country, and if such an intent exists, it is neither
justification nor excuse that the actor intended by its commission to
accomplish some ultimate good.
Id. (quoting I BISHOP'S CRIM. LAW § 341 ).
370. Cf. Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 148 n. 21 (7th Cir. 1972). In a
criminal prosecution for conspiracy, a defendant claimed the double effect as an insanity
defense. Id. The defendant stated:
I think the principle of double effect comes in there because it was not my
intent to destroy draft records as such, to conspire to destroy draft records and
so forth. ... My intent, and I think I'm using that in a technical sense, was to
influence change in this country and in American foreign policy. So that there
was a double effect, obviously.
Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rejected the defendant's arguments. Id. at
149.
371. See People v. Gindorf, 512 N.E.2d 770, 778 (III. App. Ct. 1987). The Court in
Gindorf stated:
Defendant ... contends the trial court erred when it found her guilty of murder
and not voluntary manslaughter where it was established by all the expert
testimony that she believed that it was necessary to kill her children, albeit an
unreasonable belief, to avoid the greater injury to the children of forcing them
to continue living, after defendant's suicide, their lives doomed to be spent in
misery and suffering. She argues that she believed her conduct was justified by
reason of necessity, an affirmative defense. . . . Defendant cites no authority
that the defense of necessity would justify the taking of another's life under
these facts. To so hold here would sanction conduct which amounts to "mercy
killing," a proposition which finds no support in Illinois law.
Id. at 778-79.
372. See infra notes 373-76.
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[the defendant] would not be acting in bad faith to demand that
amount from [the plaintiff] even if it knew that [the plaintiff]
would not go so high. [The defendant] would be acting in bad
faith only if its purpose in charging more than [the plaintiff]
would pay was to induce [the plaintiff] to back out of the
deal.3 73

According to Judge Posner, liability depended not on the foreseen
result, but rather on the purpose of the behavior.374 Such reasoning
applies to the principle of the double effect.3 75 Also, in a case before
the Kentucky Supreme Court upholding a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, a dissenting justice stated that "[c]ertainly there is
room for consideration of the principle of double 376 effect.
Philosophically, you may foresee the result but not intend it."
The writing of a potentially lethal prescription for the sole purpose
of alleviating pain is legal only where explicitly authorized. 377 Like
other exceptions to the criminal law, legislative action is strongly
favored over judge-made law.378 In fact, in some jurisdictions, the
double effect is codified as a statutory exception to the crime of
physician-assisted suicide.379
373. Venture Assocs. Co. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., No. 95-3574 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24653, *14-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (Judge Posner noted that "the analogy to ... the
Catholic doctrine of double effect [sic], should be apparent").
374. See supra text accompanying notes 365-66.
375. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (defining the double effect).
376. DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 715 (Ky. 1993) (Wintersheimer, J.,
dissenting).
377. Cf. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975) (holding that a physician may
dispense controlled substances only in accordance with established legal guidelines).
But see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 828 n.102 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (stating that "the administration of dual effect medication, with informed consent,
does not constitute a criminal act"), cert. granted Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
37 (1996).
378. See People v. Woodard, No. 80374, 1997 I11.
LEXIS 20, *10 (II1. Feb. 20,
1997) (stating that "where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, the court is not free
to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express"). The
defense of necessity, for example, is a narrowly defined application of the principle that
some crimes are excusable if the results are not intended and the actions are necessary to
promote a greater good. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Ch. 5/7-13 (West 1993 & Supp.
1996). Section 5/7-13 provides:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of
necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the
situation and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public
or private injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from
his own conduct.
Id.
379. See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-42-1 to 2.5(a)(1) (West 1996) (exempting from
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However, allowing a simple criminal exception for the double effect
essentially legalizes physician-assisted suicide. 38 8This is because
there is no way to observe the theoretical distinction. 8 Legally, there
is no difference between giving a person a lethal dose of medication to
alleviate his pain, which will most likely kill him, and giving a person
a lethal dose of medication to alleviate his pain because it will kill
him.382 This does not mean that there is no ethical distinction between
the two, only that the law cannot see the distinction because the law
cannot see into a person's heart.383
The greatest flaw with the double effect is that it actually includes a
broader range of behavior than physician-assisted suicide.3 84 A
physician engaging in physician-assisted suicide does so at the request
of the patient, while a physician engaging in the double effect may act
according to his own conscience. 385 The principle of the double effect
accounts only for the intention of the actor, and not for the wishes of
the patient.38 In fact, assuming that the actor intends a worthy enough
3 87
good, it is justifiable to act in opposition to the wishes of another.
the crime of assisting suicide "[any] licensed health care provider who administers . . .
medications or procedures to relieve a person's pain or discomfort, even if the medicine
or procedure may hasten . . . death, unless such medications or procedures are intended to
cause death").
380. See supra text accompanying notes 376-78.
381. Criminal law punishes a person when a judge or jury finds that the person
intended to do harm. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 24, at § 3.5(0, at 31618. Judges and juries cannot read a defendant's thoughts, and so must make an objective
determination about what the defendant intended. Id. The double effect, on the other
hand, absolves a defendant if he truly intended to do good-something only he knows.
Therefore, for legal purposes, where a difference exists between a person's objective
(observed) intent and his subjective (true) intent, that difference is inconsequential-his
observed intent prevails. Cf. 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 13:1, at 468-

69 (7th ed. 1992) (noting in a discussion about proving intent through circumstantial
evidence that "direct evidence . . . may be unavailable, inadmissible, unpersuasive, or
untrue").
382. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d. at 824 (stating "we see little, if any,
difference for constitutional or ethical purposes between providing medication with a
double effect and providing medication with a single effect, as long as one of the known
effects in each case is to hasten the end of the patient's life").
383. For an in depth discussion of intent and its role in this distinction, see Finnis,
supra note 357, at 25-30.
384. See infra notes 385-87 and accompanying text.
385. Justification of a double effect action depends on the actor's intent to do good.
See supra text accompanying note 50 for a definition of the double effect. In the context
of physician-assisted suicide, an intent to do good essentially means an intent to
alleviate pain. See supra text accompanying note 51.
386. See supra Part II.C (on the double effect).
387. See Finnis, supra note 357, at 30. Mr. Finnis states that merely knowing that
there will be a negative result, or "harm to the basic human good," does not make one's
actions unreasonable. Id.
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However, as long as a patient is conscious and rational, the established
doctrine of informed consent prohibits any such action. 8
D. The Varied Approaches of Physician-AssistedSuicide Regulations
At the root of all laws permitting physician-assisted suicide are
common, basic principles. 9 Individual versions also have their own
particular objectives." The various ways in which physician-assisted
suicide laws are written reveal both the emphases that individual laws
put on the common goals as well as any additional agenda.39' Certain
drafting styles also create unintended, and at times unwanted, results.
1. Restrictions on the Requesting Patient
One area where even minor variations in form signify fundamental
differences in philosophy involves defining the participants. 392 This is
388. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled
on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957). Some argue the opposite,
raising points reminiscent of a paternalistic past:
To be autonomous means to be . . . self-determining in the conduct of one's
life. But what exercises of this capacity are genuinely valuable and, as such,
to be respected?
[T]he notion of 'best interests' as applied to the care of patients has an
objective interpretation within the moral framework. . . . What medically
serves a patient's best interests is what secures either a patient's restoration to
health or some approximation to health, or if the patient is dying, effectively
controls distressing symptoms.
Luke Gormally, Walton, Davies, Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 113, 118-19 (John Keown ed., 1995).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30 (noting that all legislation
permitting physician-assisted suicide requires that the requesting patient be "terminal").
390. Compare Death with Dignity Act, H.R. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me.
1997) (requiring a physician to be present when the patient uses the fatal prescription),
with Colorado Dignity in Death Act, H.R. 1185, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 1996) (not requiring, but allowing a physician or another person to be present
when the patient uses the fatal prescription).
39 I. Some physician-assisted suicide laws place greater emphasis on a patient's pain
as a requirement to request assistance. Compare H.R. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt.
1997) (requiring a requesting patient to suffer from a "terminal illness"), with H.R. 474,
1995 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996) (requiring a requesting patient to suffer from a "painful fatal
condition"). Some physician-assisted suicide laws place a greater emphasis on
physician immunity than others. Compare S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996)
(applying a subjective standard for physician liability), with Terminally Ill Patient Act
of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995) (determining physician liability
under an objective standard).
392. Compare Death With Dignity Act, H.R. 663, 118th Leg., 1st Leg. Sess. (Me.
1997) (restricting the relationship between the assisting and consulting physician by
forbidding them from having offices in the same building), with Mississippi Death with
Dignity Act, H.R. 1023, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1996) (placing no restriction on the
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expressed most vividly in the different qualifications physicianassisted suicide laws place on requesting patients.393 Perhaps the most
important and widely varied
of all qualifications is the definition of the
3
"terminal" requirement. 9
Although it is questionable whether such a requirement has a strong
basis in medical practice, nearly all physician-assisted suicide laws
impose a prognosis of death within six months. 395 The origin for this
requirement may lie in Medicare guidelines which limit hospice
reimbursements to situations where a physician can certify a six month
prognosis.
The distinction is legal, not medical, and it results in one
significant effect.3 97 It provides a bright line in defending against the

slippery slope arguments that plague efforts to legalize physicianassisted suicide. 398 A required, quantified life expectancy provides a
simple definition for excluding persons, and so clearly and effectively
limits the application of a physician-assisted suicide law. 399
Unfortunately, such an arbitrary limitation does not differentiate
among requesting patients in a meaningful way.1 In fact, such a
definition ignores the basic principle that physician-assisted suicide
should be made available to alleviate suffering."' A person with brain
relationship between the assisting and consulting physician).
393. Compare H.R. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997) (requiring a requesting
patient to suffer from a "terminal illness"), with H.R. 474, 1995 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1996)
(requiring a requesting patient to suffer from a "painful fatal condition").
394. See supra notes 124-26 (although the definition of terminal varies by
jurisdiction, in all jurisdictions with such laws, the definition at a minimum means that
the condition causing the suffering will eventually result in the patient's death).
395. See A.B. 32, 93rd Sess. (Wis. 1997) (providing that the terminal disease will
cause death within six months). But see H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997)
(defining terminal as likely to produce death within one year). For a medical definition
of terminal see TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 124.
396. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (1994) (providing that "[a]n individual is
considered to be 'terminally ill' if the individual has a medical prognosis that the
individual's life expectancy is 6 months or less"); 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.20-.22 (1996)
(providing that "to be eligible to elect hospice care under Medicare, an individual must
be . . .[clertified as being terminally ill in accordance with § 418.22," which provides
that "the certification must specify that the individual's prognosis is for a life
expectancy of 6 months or less").
397. Brian C. Goebel, Note, Who Decides if There is "Triumph in the Ultimate
Agony?" Constitutional Theory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity, 37 WM.&
MARY L. REV. 827, 894 (1996).
398. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 10-1I.
399. Id.
400. Excerpts from the Supreme Court Decision on Physician-Assisted Suicide
[Washington v. Glucksburg], WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1997, at A16. "[Wihy is it limited to
those on the threshold of death? I mean suppose ... the doctor says you're going to be
in terrible pain for ten years .... Why shouldn't I have the right to suicide?" Id.
401. See supra text accompanying note 122 (noting the twin goals of physician-
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cancer who has two months to live may feel fine, while an AIDS
patient who has more than a year remaining might suffer excruciating
pain. 2 To insist on a requirement so disconnected from any essential
goal of physician-assisted suicide laws does nothing to flatten slippery
slope claims, and may actually support them.4°3 Such an unprincipled
qualification supports the conclusion that any limitation is illusory.'
While defining a terminal condition 405 as one that will eventually
result in death presents no serious diagnosis problems, the same is not
' 40 6
necessarily true for defining "unbearable physical suffering.
Nevertheless, this is not an insurmountable problem. 407 It is true that
the determination that a patient is feeling unbearable pain or suffering
begins with the patient's own subjective determination. 4 8 However,
physicians are specifically trained to interpret a patient's own
subjective determination about pain and suffering.40 9 In addition,
"pain management" is fast becoming an important and accepted new
area of practice that includes its own specialists and treatment
centers.41 °
assisted suicide laws: (1) providing an effective means to end untreatable suffering; and
(2) protecting the patient's right of self-determination). But see Kamisar, supra note
115, at 235 (arguing that basing a right to physician-assisted suicide on intractable
suffering is no less arbitrary than basing it on "terminal illness" and is further
complicated by the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of objective measurement).
402. Good Care of the Dying Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 475 (1996) (report of the
American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs).
403. A physician-assisted suicide law having such a qualification might be the basis
for an equal protection argument that physician-assisted suicide should be made
available to everyone.
404. See Goebel, supra note 397, at 893-95 (arguing that an arbitrary six month
limitation renders physician-assisted suicide laws unconstitutional); see infra Appendix
A, § 7.3.
405. See infra Appendix A § (2)(a).
406. See infra Appendix A § (2)(b). See also Kamisar, supra note 115, at 235-36
(arguing that not all pain is truly unbearable, that pain is under-treated, that pain and
suffering are too subjective to be defined and determined, that psychological and
physical pain are indistinguishable, and that, ultimately, one is limited to the patient's
own determinations of the terms).
407. See infra text accompanying notes 409-10.
408.

See Finding the Right Cure for Chronic Pain, 14 BUSINESS & HEALTH 17, 19

(1996) (noting that "the highly subjective nature of pain creates a diagnostic challenge
for physicians").
409. See Sridhar V. Vasudevan & Timothy N. Lynch, Pain Centers-Organizationand
Outcome; Rehabilitation Medicine; Adding Life to Years, 154 THE WESTERN J.MED.
532, 532 (1991).
410. See generally, Shannon Brownlie, et al., The Quality of Mercy Effective Pain
Treatments Already Exist. Why aren't doctors using them?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 17, 1997, at 54 (offering that with effective pain management physician-assisted
suicide is probably unnecessary).
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One potential pitfall in the definition of terminal is the label "terminal
illness" itself.41' It is possible to argue that an illness only includes
disease or infections. 2 However, not all terminal conditions are the
result of such limited causes. 413 Defining terminal to include a
condition or bodily disorder clarifies that the cause of a person's
terminal status is irrelevant. 4
Competency is arguably the most important limitation placed on
requesting patients.41 5 The first, admittedly arbitrary hurdle,
adulthood, is a common restriction in the law.4 16 Some have
suggested that if physician-assisted suicide is allowed for anyone, it
should be allowed for all.4" 7 However, it is widely recognized that
children need special protection from the law 1 Simply excluding
them from coverage under physician-assisted suicide laws is an
appropriate and efficient means to afford them that protection. 9
411. See, e.g., Katskee v. Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Nebraska, 515 N.W.2d 645,
651 (Neb. 1994) (arguing whether the plaintiff's breast-ovarian carcinoma syndrome
was an 'illness' for purposes of insurance coverage, or, as the defendant-insurer
proffered, merely a predisposition to an illness since the plaintiff did not actually have
cancer).
412. Id. at 649-51.
413. For example, Nancy Cruzan's condition was the result of a car accident. Cruzan
v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
414. See, e.g., H.R. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. § 5280(l1) (Vt. 1997) (defining
"terminal condition" as "an incurable condition caused by injury or disease").
415. See generally Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997). See also supra text accompanying notes 132-47
(discussing competency).
416. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979). "[T]he fact that a minor
may be very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his or her need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended." Id.
417. See, e.g., Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1433. "While the practical effect of a state law
may be to create some inequality between particular classes of persons . . . it cannot
create an illusory classification where the reasons for the law apply equally to all
members of the public." Id.
418. See Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child
Relationship, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 264 (1995) (noting that the concept of "parens
patriae . . . represented an advance in society's protection of children. .

.

. [And] the

beginning of society's recognition that the legal system might need to interfere with
the family relationship in some cases to protect the health, safety, and general wellbeing of children").
419. At a minimum there is no constitutional bar to doing so. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding that preventing those age 18-20 from voting
does not violate equal protection). An argument could be made for more rigorous
standards for children, rather than outright exclusion. These standards might take the
form of substituted judgment by a child's legal guardians, or as suggested by the Lee
court, legal proceedings in the style of a commitment procedure. See Lee, 891 F. Supp.
at 1434-35. This Comment does not advocate such a position and renders no opinion as
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Despite the language of some physician-assisted suicide laws,
competency is not solely determined by adulthood.42 Because of the
importance of competency, laws that do not further address the issue
probably do not intend to suggest that adulthood is the only
criterion. 42 At most, adulthood simply provides a useful point from
which competency can be presumed.422 At a minimum, it is evidence
in favor of concluding that the requesting patient has the ability to
understand, formulate, and communicate health care decisions.423
This is the essence of competency, and it is the conclusion that must be
drawn before a requesting patient is allowed to proceed.424
The different ways in which this conclusion is reached clearly reflect
the emphasis placed on competency.425 Laws that textually require
nothing beyond adulthood seem to place the least value on
competency, although considering that many of these further claim to
prize the requesting patient's free will and well being, such omissions
probably represent sloppy drafting. 426 Those that require
psychological evaluations only if the assisting doctor suspects a mental
defect place a similarly diminished value on competency.427 On the
other hand, laws that require psychological evaluations and clearly
to its feasibility.
420. See S. 334, Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1995) (providing that the requesting patient be
"eighteen years of age or older and be able to understand the nature and consequences of
such medication").
421. Discussions about physician-assisted suicide generally presume that patient
competence is a prerequisite. See, e.g., Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right
to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1992) (noting that "[iun
general, competent patients who suffer from a terminal illness have a right to die by
having life-saving treatment withheld or withdrawn) (emphasis added).
422. A majority of statutes require psychological evaluations only for those patients
an assisting doctor suspects may be incompetent, which suggests that competency is
presumed in favor of the requesting patient.
423. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 303 (I11.1989). The court noted
that "to make an 'informed' decision to accept or refuse treatment, the patient must have
a full understanding of the nature of the illness and the prognosis, the information
necessary to evaluate the risks and benefits of all the available treatment options, and
the competency to make a reasoned and voluntary decision. Id. Cf. People v. Nemke,
263 N.E.2d 97, 101 (I11.1970) (age may be considered in determining competency).
424. See supra text accompanying note 137. But see S. 1007 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
§ 36-3101(8) (Ariz. 1996) (defining "qualified patient" as a "capable adult").
425. Compare S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1996) (defining competent and
requiring psychological evaluations in all cases), with H.R. 474, 1995 Leg. Sess. § 5701(J) (Md. 1996) (requiring that a patient be "mentally competent" while neither
defining what that means, nor requiring that the assisting physician's own assessment
of mentally competent be confirmed by anyone).
426. See, e.g., H.R. 2965, 69th Leg. Assembly (Or. 1997) (defining competence for
the existing ODWDA).
427. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1325-26.
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define the goals of those
sessions place a comparatively higher value
4 28
on patient competency.
If the decision to request assistance in suicide is the product of
depression or some other mental defect, the patient is not considered
competent.429 Many laws treat the existence of depression as
conclusively rendering a patient incompetent. 430 This could have the
effect of making physician-assisted suicide laws moot; since a
suffering, terminally ill person is likely to experience some degree of
depression. 3' But not everyone agrees that depression automatically
renders one legally incompetent.4 32 Case law supports this
conclusion, stating that the existence of a mental defect, even severe
depression, does not automatically render a person incapable of
making decisions having serious legal consequences. 33 A person is
incompetent only where the defect is a primary, motivating factor
428. See, e.g., S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-4 (R.l. 1996).
429. See, e.g., H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. § 5280(3) (Vt. 1997) (requiring a
counselor, if called, to determine that the "patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or
psychological disorder or depression which causes the patient to have impaired
judgment").
430. See, e.g., S.2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-1 (R.l. 1996).
431. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1435 (D. Or. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997). See James Henderson Brown, et al., Is It Normal for
Terminally Ill Patients to Desire Death?, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 208 (1986)
(suggesting that while the terminally ill are no more likely to have a tendency toward
suicide, those who do are very likely to experience depression).
432. See Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 760 n.
279 (1986) (urging that "[a]n adult can be depressed or confused to some extent, yet
remain competent to refuse treatment" (citing cases)).
433. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d. 375 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a
depressed person was competent to decide to forgo life-sustaining treatment). See also
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985). In Rumbaugh, a convicted
murderer waiting on death row decided not to pursue an appeal of his execution order. Id.
at 396. Against his wishes, his parents were pursuing an appeal. Id. at 397. In a
competency hearing to decide whether he could dismiss his appeals, or whether his
parents should proceed as next friend, the defendant took the stand and declared "I've ...
made the decision to take matters into my own hands" and "I'll just make them kill me."
Id. The defendant then lunged at a United States Marshall with a makeshift knife
shouting "Shoot!" Id. The court upheld his competency in spite of a finding of severe
depression. Id. at 402-03. The court stated that "[we cannot] conclude as a matter of law
that a person who finds his life situation intolerable and who welcomes an end to the life
experience is necessarily legally incompetent to forgo further legal proceedings." Id. at
403.
Another court, through testimony of a psychologist and psychiatrist, found a
defendant competent by a preponderance of the evidence, in spite of his depression and
low intelligence. See United States v. Frank, 933 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir.), amended
and superseded by 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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behind the decision. 434 Even when the mental defect influences the
decision, it will be allowed if the decision is rational.435
Ensuring competency and rationality is the primary motivation
behind regulating the timing of physician-assisted suicide laws.43 6
Waiting periods focus less on a patient's ability to make rational,
sound decisions than on actually ensuring that he do SO. 4 3 7 These
periods are created to give a patient time to reflect and perhaps consult
with family or close friends.438 It is hoped that these provisions
prevent a patient from making hasty, emotional decisions.439
Deadlines, on the other hand, are specifically designed to ensure
competency and voluntariness. 440 Minimizing the amount of time
between a patient's final request and a doctor's prescription for a lethal
substance helps ensure that a patient has not lapsed into incompetence
by the time he is given the means to end his life.4 4' Some have
suggested that protections must go further, actually guaranteeing
competency at the time the patient uses his fatal prescription." 2
Requiring proof of competency at the moment a patient uses his fatal
prescription presents several problems. First, from a practical
perspective, once a patient is given the means to end his life, how can
it be taken away? The obvious answer is to strictly control the timing
of the end of the patient's life by restricting access to the lethal
substance until the actual moment of use." 3 However, such a solution
is worse than the problem. As a matter of privacy, a patient deserves
434. See Baron, supra note 153, at 18.
435. Id.
436. See Matthew P. Previn, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions
of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. L.J. 589, 613 (1996) (urging state hearings and
"short waiting periods [between the time of request and administration of physicianassisted suicide] to safeguard against a decision made in haste or in a period of temporary
depression).
437. See id. at 612-13 (advocating a short waiting period to ensure voluntariness,
competence, family notification, and consultation with a second physician); see also
Jody B. Gabel, Release from Terminal Suffering?: The Impact of AIDS on Medically
Assisted Suicide Legislation, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 369, 420 (1994) (discussing
mandatory procedural safeguards, including a waiting period, in the ODWDA).
438. See Previn, supra note 436, at 612-13.
439. See Sitcoff, supra note 34, at 709.
440. Id. at 710 (arguing for deadlines or "maximum waiting periods").
441. Id. See also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1437 (D. Or. 1995) (stating that
Oregon's Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide with no legal protection to an
"over-inclusive" class of persons who could be competent, incompetent, unduly
influenced or abused), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No.
95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997).
442. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
443. See Sitcoff, supra note 34, at 709-10.
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to be free of state interference at the end of his life. 4" Perhaps more
importantly, limiting the time during which a substance must be used
would be a coercive force causing the patient to use the substance. 445
Many patients request assistance in ending their lives as a way to
obtain the peace needed to face their final time.446 For them,
impending days of unbearable suffering overshadow a current time of
relative comfort.447 What they are really searching for is the
knowledge that they have the power to exit should conditions become
unbearable.448 In fact, many patients who are given prescriptions
never actually use them. 449 However, imposing a time limit on the use
of a prescribed substance puts patients who have already spent the
time, energy and money to secure potential release, into danger of
losing that release.4 50 Rather than face an uncertain but foreboding
future, most would probably choose an immediate end.45'
2. Restrictions on Physicians
Appropriately, the proposed physician-assisted suicide legislation
minimally restricts physicians.452 However, concerns about a
physician's ability to make difficult diagnoses concerning pain and
suffering are not unfounded. 453 Thus, as is almost universally agreed,
444. There is a necessary trade off between state protection and privacy. See Baron et
al., supra note 153, at I1. This Comment suggests that the level of protection offered
by such a provision is so attenuated that it should not restrict a patient's privacy
expectations.
445. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 171, stating:
[l]f she had not had the assurance of a controlled death when her suffering
became intolerable, much of the quality of the three months that she did have
would have been contaminated by fear and searching for a potential way out.
She might even have taken an earlier escape through suicide, since she would
have had to fear becoming too weak to act on her own if she waited too long.
Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See id.
449. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 922.
450. It is elementary that limitations periods create strong incentives to exercise
rights in danger of being lost. Cf. Delta Air lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352
(1981) (noting that Rule 68 provides an incentive to settle where there is a strong
probability that the plaintiff will recover).
451. SeeQUILLsupra note 93, at 171.
452. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 17 (stating that while certain conditions,
such as a special relationship, would be desirable, they are not required by the proposed
model law).
453. Good Care of the Dying Patient, supra note 402, at 475 (noting the lack of
precise scientific data concerning pain prevalence and incidence, some difficulties
physicians face in pain management, and concluding that "[t]he prescription of pain
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requiring the consent of two physicians is good policy.454
Accordingly, requiring at least one of the doctors to have a heightened
level of expertise in comfort care or care of the dying would produce
several benefits. First, it would add an additional level of
specialization to the diagnosis.455 Second, it would help ensure that
patients receive adequate palliative care.456 Lastly, it would make it
more likely that requesting patients are well-informed about the
alternatives to physician-assisted suicide.457
Requiring a special relationship between the doctor and patient, on
the other hand, would be problematic.458 The motivation underlying
such a requirement is fear that an assisting doctor, who has not
developed a special relationship with the patient, will act too quickly
and without adequate consideration of the patient's medical history and
individual needs.45 9 While individualized attention should be present
in any major medical decision, the reality is that, in today's system 4of6
managed health care, it is a luxury that relatively few people enjoy.
In addition, even for those having a "primary physician," that doctor
might object to rendering assistance on moral grounds. 46' This would
leave many patients at the mercy of their physicians' moral beliefs and
put objecting doctors in an awkward position. 462 A further problem
medications to the point of obtundation in the last days of life may more commonly
reflect provider behavior rather than patient preferences or needs").
454. See, e.g., Previn, supra note 436, at 613 (stating that the patient should consult
a second physician); see also QUILL, supra note 93, at 163 (noting that consultation with
another physician is highly recommended).
455. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 162 (highlighting the importance of comfort care
to the physician's role).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 163 (noting that documentation and additional consultation help the
patient to make a well-informed decision).
458. See Baron et al., supra note 153 at 17 (stating that ethical constraints may
prevent some physicians from assisting suicide).
459. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 162-63 (suggesting that a relationship between the
physician and the patient makes the situation more manageable).
460. Paul W. Newacheck et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Managed Care for
Children with Chronic Illnesses and Disabilities,98 PEDIATRICS 952, 954 (1996)
(stating that "[c]ustomary doctor-patient relationships may be disrupted for many
families as they enter organized systems of care").
461. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 17 (suggesting that a physician may not
think physician-assisted suicide constitutes an ethical alternative); see also QUILL, supra
note 93, at 163 (noting that no physician should be forced to assist a patient's suicide if
it violates the physician's "fundamental values").
462. Id. (commenting that, to avoid the ethical constraints, a patient may need
another physician to provide that person with the means for suicide); see also QUILL,
supra note 93, at 162-63 (finding that an alternative physician may facilitate the means
for suicide).
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lies in defining what constitutes primary responsibility.463 Such vague
terminology presents a potential anchor for litigation without affording
much real protection.' Requiring a special relationship between the
physician and his patient represents another area where statutory law
injects itself into an area better left to the policies of health care
providers.46
3. General Procedural Safeguards
Lawmakers impose additional procedural safeguards to ensure that
the patient's participation is voluntary.4 Rules governing the request
for assistance are particularly important and should be carefully
considered.467 Requiring written requests is a good idea for a few
reasons. They provide an enduring record of the transactions and
encourage a patient to consider his decision carefully. 8 A writing is
also generally thought to be more indicative of a person's true intent
than his spoken words. 469 However, the term "written" should be
expanded to include "recorded., 47' Excluding videotaped requests
prevents the physically disabled from requesting assistance, should
they desire.47 ' In addition, oral requests serve an important function.
Just as deference is given to juries and judges who observe the live
463. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1233 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (defining the role of a "primary physician" for the purpose of determining
agency under an HMO agreement).
464. See Fredrick Schauer, Philosophy of Language and Legal Interpretation,58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 399, 404 (1985) (noting that in the context of Constitutional law
"relatively precise language forestalls litigation with respect even as to matters of great
moment, while relatively vague language encourages litigation").
465. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976) (viability of a
fetus is a matter better left to a physician's judgment than to legislation). See also
Robert C. Louthian III & Elizabeth M. Mills, Physician Recruitment After Hermann
Hospital, 4 ANN. HEALTH L. 1, 19 (1995) (IRS should not interfere with a hospital's
judgment about who receives tax exempt funds when the funds further an exempt
purpose).
466. See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 437, at 374 (specifying that AIDS cases, in
particular, require special attention to ensure that the procedure is voluntary).
467. See Sitcoff, supra note 34, at 701-03 (discussing the ODWDA and the numerous
safeguards surrounding procedure).
468. Cf. State v. Downs, 672 P.2d 416, 418 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that a
writing provides strong evidence that the defendant waived his right to a jury trial).
469. See id. (asserting that a writing requirement ensures the waiver of a jury trial is
"knowing, voluntary and intelligent").
470. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 29 (permitting video and audio taped
requests in a proposed model law to allow Physician-assisted suicide). Cf. Sitcoff, supra
note 34, at 705 (citing the Michigan Act, which attempts to accommodate patients that
cannot write their signatures by allowing another person to sign the directive so long as
the signing is in the presence of the patient).
471. Id.
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testimony of witnesses, requiring an oral request provides an extra
measure of protection against fraud or duress
472 by allowing a physician
to actually see the patient make the request.
Equally important to the form of making requests is the requirement
that people witness them.473 Witnessing significant legal documents
has a long, established tradition.474 The witnesses ensure that the
patient's request is voluntary, and not the result of duress or impaired
judgment.475 The witness also provides the physician with a measure
of protection against future liability for his actions.476 At least one
witness should have no familial, professional, or financial relationship
with any of the persons performing duties oi requesting assistance.
Otherwise, the objectivity of the witness is questionable, rendering the
value of his role negligible. 478 However, allowing a family member to
serve as an additional witness brings needed support and a familiar
face to what otherwise might be a host of strangers.479
There seems to be little consensus among laws concerning what
constitutes an effective revocation of a request.480 Balancing the need
to protect patients from duress and hasty judgments with the desire to
avoid overly burdensome procedures, the degree of procedure required
to revoke should mirror the amount required for making requests.481
472. Cf. People v. Calvert, 629 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (I11.App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to
disturb a jury's findings of fact while noting the jury's ability to personally observe the
testimony of witnesses).
473. See Gabel, supra note 437, at 428 (noting that a qualified witness should view
the signing of the request).
474. See, e.g., GEORGE E. GARDNER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS 199 (Walter T.
Dunmore ed., 2d ed. 1916) (noting that since the nineteenth century, statutes have
required that wills be witnessed).
475. See Gabel, supra note 437, at 428.
476. See generally Baron et al., supra note 153, at 12.
477. See Alison C. Hall, To Die With Dignity: Comparing Physician Assisted
Suicide in the United States, Japan and the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 838
n.231 (1996) (listing the requirements for a witness according to the Hemlock Society).
478. See I A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 134 (4th ed. 1980) (recommending as
a minimum standard that witnesses to a will should have "no interest vested or
contingent in the property disposed of by the testator's will").
479. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 164 (encouraging the involvement of family in the
process, if the patient wishes).
480. Compare Death with Dignity Act, H.R. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Mich.
1995) (permitting revocation "at any time" and "in any manner"), with Terminally III
Patient Act of 1995, S. 5596, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Wash. 1995) (requiring a
patient to clearly state his intentions).
48 1. The more procedures a person has to endure, the more likely it is that the person
has carefully considered his decision, and is resolved to it. See Richard Hyland, Life,
Death, and Contract,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 204, 216 (1995) (noting that formalities, such
as consideration in contract law, are evidence that a person has given due thought to a
decision and intends that his actions have legal consequences). Accordingly, it is
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In other words, the more formal the request procedures, the more
explicit the revocation. Conversely, physician-assisted suicide laws
with looser requirements for requesting assistance should allow
revocation easily.482 Because physician-assisted suicide laws require
the patient to actually administer the lethal substance himself, it is
questionable whether revocation communicated "inany manner" is
necessary.4 3 In fact, well meaning persons may selectively interpret a
patient's "communications," forcing revocation and thwarting a
patient's true wishes.484 In no event, however, should a request be
constructively revoked for "declaring an inconsistent intent."" 5 Such
a procedure would have'a silencing effect on patients, who would be
unable to discuss the pros and cons of their decision for fear that
showing a lack of resolve might forbid them from proceeding. 4 6 As a
matter of procedure, revocation should annul all procedures previously
met.487 If a patient changes his mind, he should begin again, with the
procedures set forth in the statute. 488
Safeguards requiring physician disclosures through essentially
codifying rules of informed consent are valuable guides for both courts
and doctors.489 Such rules clarify the kinds of information a patient
must be given before his request and consent can be considered
appropriate to require a clear expression that the person has changed his mind before he
is not permitted to proceed. Because the patient must personally perform some explicit
act in order to receive the lethal dose of medication, there is little danger of coercion.
See infra Appendix A § 14.
482. See, e.g., S. 1007, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 1996) (section 36-108(A)
requires that a patient make two requests, one written and one oral, and § 36-3109
permits a patient to rescind "at any time and in any manner").
483. Some drafters of physician-assisted suicide laws hold the opposite view. See,
e.g., Gabel, supra note 437, at 428-29 (commenting that the Model Act provides
numerous other safeguards to ensure that the physician adheres to the patient's wishes).
484. See Craig P. Goldman, Revising Iowa's Life-sustaining Procedures: Creating a
Practical Guide to Living Wills in Iowa, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1162 (1991). Goldman
notes that in the context of a living will, allowing family members to decide a
revocation, "in any manner by which [he] can ascertain the declarant's intent" poses a
problem that a bereaved family member may find "revocation" in the twitch of a finger.
Id. This could give family members an effective "veto power" over a patient's decision.
Id.
485. S. 2985, 95th Leg., Jan Sess. § 23-4.12-3(a)(3)(D) (R.I. 1996) (requiring a
patient's request be "repeated without self-contradiction").
486. But see QUILL, supra note 93, at 161-62 (encouraging a patient to discuss the
decision).
487. See, e.g., Death with Dignity Act, H.R. 4134, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Mich.
1995) (providing that if a directive is revoked, "it shall be as if the directive [for
physician-assisted suicide] was never executed or the request never communicated").
488. See id.
489. See Baron et al., supra note 153, at 12-13 (noting that clear procedures will
prevent a flood of litigation and avoid a "slippery slope").
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valid.4 90 While informed consent to physician-assisted suicide is
essential, the Rhode Island procedure is unduly cumbersome, time
" ' Such hyper-attention to
consuming, and difficult to coordinate.49
recording doctor-patient interaction is a much better shield against a
physician's liability than a tool for increasing the patient's
understanding.492
While no law requires actual family notification, all laws obligate a
physician to suggest that a requesting patient notify his family of his
request for assistance in suicide.49 3 A required statement like this is
different from an informed consent disclosure, in that the information
itself does not aid a patient in making his decision.494 Instead, this
particular requirement reflects the belief that under ideal conditions,
family members should participate in a decision of this magnitude.495
However, limiting the requirement to a mere suggestion of family
notification takes the provision out of the legal realm and turns it into a
statement of policy. 496 Statutory law is an inappropriate place to do
this. This sort of standard would be much more suitable as a health
care provider's own guideline, rather than as an apparently binding
rule of law. 497 To couch non-binding suggestion in legal terms opens
the door to pointless litigation and ambiguity without affording any
real benefit. Physician-assisted suicide laws should not obligate a
physician to suggest family notification. Family notification should
either be required or not.
4. Immunity and Liability
It is remarkable that a majority of physician-assisted suicide laws
include a subjective standard for determining civil liability for
490. See Gabel, supra note 437, at 399-400 (listing requirements that a doctor should
follow before administering the procedure).
491. See S. 2985, 1996 Leg., Jan. Sess. § 23-4.12-4(d)(3) (R.I. 1996) (requiring that
patient requests for physician-assisted suicide be either video or audio taped, or written
and signed, as well as witnessed).
492. But see Baron et al., supra note 153, at 12 (discussing procedural safeguards that
protect both the patient and doctor).
493. See, e.g., Death With Dignity Act, H.R. 663, 118th Leg., Ist Leg. Sess. (Me.
1997); see also QUILL supra note 93, at 164 (encouraging family discussion).
494. Informed consent requires that a physician provide a patient with information
necessary to make the decision. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292,
303 (111.1989).
495. See QUILL, supra note 93, at 164 (encouraging a doctor to involve the patients'
family to comfort and support the patient).
496. Policy is defined as the principles that guide the government in the management
of public affairs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (6th ed. 1990).

497. See Nelson et al., supra note 432, at 760 (citing the right of a health care
provider to impose treatment as it sees fit).
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physicians.498 Subjective standards are almost unknown in the area of
medical malpractice.4 99 This is because a subjective standard creates
an almost irrefutable presumption in favor of the professional. 00
Making a subjective test the standard for liability in a physicianassisted suicide law is especially striking since concerns for the
patient's well being are surely no less important than in other instances
of medical negligence. 01
Because physician-assisted suicide laws create an exception to
existing criminal law, lesser criminal penalties are needed to deal with
breaches of procedure and instances of duress. 2 Relying solely on
existing criminal law is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the
existing penalties may be significantly more severe than warranted by
the breach. 3 Second, depending on the language of the physicianassisted suicide law, a minor breach of procedure might not be enough
to establish criminal liability under the existing law.
V.

PROPOSAL

The current laws governing physician-assisted suicide neither
prevent the practice nor effectively control it.5 4 The "officiallysanctioned" method, the double effect, is unsatisfactory because the
practice cannot truly be limited to the theory. 5 Allowing physicianassisted suicide under an unregulated defense in the style of necessity
would leave Illinois citizens with an underground version of the Dutch
system. 0 6 Because of the potential for abuse under the current
498. See supra Part ll.B.l(d) (discussing physician liability and noting that many
statutes regarding physician-assisted suicide rely on the physician's judgment to
determine when administration of physician-assisted suicide is appropriate, rather than
an objective, 'reasonable physician' standard of care).
499. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 40, § 32, at 186-87 (claiming that the doctor
must perform with the skill and care ordinarily employed by members in good standing).
500. See Rich, supra note 117, at 97-98 n.99 (arguing that a subjective standard
renders a plaintiffs argument about information regarding a decision inconsequential).
501. But see Baron et al., supra note 153, at 19 (arguing that a subjective standard
adequately protects the patient).
502. See id.
503. Compare Death with Dignity, A.B. 32, 1997-98 Leg., 93d Reg. Sess. § 156.27
(Wis. 1997) (punishing "any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces,
obliterates, or damages the request for medication of another without the requester's
consent" with a maximum fine of $500 and / or a maximum prison sentence of thirty
days), with Wis. STAT. § 940.12 (1996) (making assisting a suicide a class D felony).
504. The law does not effectively criminalize physician-assisted suicide. See supra
Part lV.B. The law does not effectively or adequately allow physician-assisted suicide.
See supra Part IV.C.
505. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the double effect).
506. See supra Part 1II.C.2 (discussing the Dutch system, which allows physicians to
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system, physician-assisted suicide should be explicitly legalized.
Statutory legalization addresses physician-assisted suicide concerns
squarely and strikes a balance that the public has demonstrated it wants
5°7
between an accepted procedure and the legitimate role of the state.
This Comment proposes an Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide
Act. This Act is created to allow qualified patients to receive a safe,
effective, medical means to suicide. 50 9 Each of the provisions of the
proposed law are designed to end otherwise untreatable suffering and
to protect a patient's right of self-determination. Although this
Comment argues that physician-assisted suicide laws are
constitutional, the terms of this law are designed to address certain
constitutional and procedural concerns raised by the Lee court. 1 °
A. The Requesting Patient
In sharp contrast to the majority of physician-assisted suicide laws,
but consistent with their basic goals, this Comment proposes that the
primary limitation on requesting patients should not be their proximity
to death, but rather their unbearable suffering.5 ' A requesting patient
must still meet the medical definition of terminal, however. 512 By
shifting the focus of a patient's qualifications from his remaining time
to his suffering, the proposed law avoids the implication that a
person's life decreases in value as it nears death.51 3 Instead, the
proposed law recognizes that a patient's interest in ending his extreme
suffering is greater than the state's interest in preserving his life when
the cause of the suffering will eventually result in death. In order to
actually administer the lethal drug, and rests in physicians the power to determine if and
when a patient should be put to death).
507. Because there is no public will to enforce laws criminalizing physician-assisted
suicide and because a majority of people favor making the practice legal, physicianassisted suicide should be legalized and regulated. See supra Part IV.B. This argument is
distinguishable from similar arguments relating to the legalization of currently illegal
drugs, in that such laws are merely difficult to enforce, and are supported
overwhelmingly by the public.
508. See infra Appendix A.
509. Seeinfra Appendix A §1.
510. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1432-37 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that the Act
failed to rationally relate to any state interest that ensured that the patient made a
voluntary decision), vacated and remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No.
95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997).
5 i1. See infra Appendix A.
512. This definition imposes no time limit on when a patient might die. See supra
Part lll.B.I.a. See infra Appendix A §2.b.
5 13. See Euthanasia in the Netherlands, supra note 264, at 262 (noting that a doctor
who performs euthanasia can judge a patient's condition accurately by monitoring their
ability to form the intent to request the procedure). See infra Appendix A §2.b.
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avoid uncertainty in causation, the term1 4"terminally ill" should be
expanded to include a physical condition.
In qualifying a patient's competency, adulthood is a useful starting
point. Making physician-assisted suicide available to minors under
strict procedures may be possible, but it is unnecessary for
constitutional purposes. Such a law would also be of dubious policy,
balancing the potential dangers against the small number of people
likely to participate.1 6 Still, adulthood should be far from conclusive.
Screening by licensed counselors should be done as a matter of
course. 517 Recognizing, however, the strong causal link between a
mental defect and the terminal condition, patients should not be
summarily excluded simply because a mental defect exists. A patient
should only be excluded from receiving assistance if his decision to
request assistance is primarily motivated by the mental condition.
Only patients deemed unable to understand, formulate and
communicate health care decisions should be rejected. In the event a
patient is deemed incompetent, his request must be considered void,
and the responsible counselor should make a reasonable effort to
notify the family of the requesting patient. 51 8 Ordinarily, such a
notification would be a violation of the doctor-patient privilege, but it
is both legal and justified to protect the patient under the
circumstances. 1 9
Regulations of timing serve a useful, though limited, purpose. For
any physician-assisted suicide law using extreme suffering as its
primary qualification, waiting periods should be kept to a minimum.
Nevertheless, a mandatory period of reflection is appropriate in a
decision of this nature. Accordingly, instead of the usual fifteen day
waiting period, this Comment proposes seven days for reflection.52 °
On the other hand, deadlines and other micro-management of the final
moments are avoided in the proposed law. 52' This decision represents

5 14. See infra Appendix A § 2.a.i.
5 15. See infra Appendix A § 3.a.i.
516. See Back et al., supra note 85, at 921 (noting that the majority of persons
requesting physician-assisted suicide were over 65 years of age).
517. See infra Appendix A §6.
518. See infra Appendix A §7.3.
519. See generally Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1433-37 (D. Or. 1995)
(commenting about the patients' competence in making such a decision), vacated and
remanded, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 95-35804, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5429 (9th Cir. March 21, 1997).
520. See infra Appendix A §7.3.
521. See infra Appendix A.
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both a desire to prevent any coercive pressures and to preserve a
patient's privacy at the end of his life.
B. Physicians
Regulations concerning the physician are confined to making sure
that the diagnoses concerning suffering are correct. To achieve this
result, at least one physician is required to have special expertise in this
area.5 22 In addition, because of the difficulty physicians face in
diagnosing depression and its effect on a patient's decision, a licensed
counselor should make such determinations in every case.5 2 3
Provisions that would require a special relationship between the patient
and the assisting doctor are not included in the proposed law.524
C. ProceduralSafeguards
Because the ultimate consequence of a physician-assisted suicide
law is death, all procedural requirements should be written with an eye
toward preventing duress, coercion, and fraud. Special attention
needs be given to family, professional, and financial relationships
among all participants. Although it is appropriate to create strict
guidelines to eliminate conflicting interests, care should be taken to
avoid making requirements that afford little protection while creating a
risk of unforeseen lawsuits.
VI. CONCLUSION

Physician-assisted suicide is essentially legal in Illinois. Although it
is not practiced openly, physician-assisted suicide is commonly
performed by physicians believing themselves to be justified by the
"double effect." The existing Illinois ban on physician-assisted suicide
is not enforced and offers scant protection to patients. The result is
that in Illinois, as in the Netherlands, physician-assisted suicide occurs
at the sole discretion of physicians, and without effective safeguards.
To protect its citizens, and to prevent the dangers resulting from
incomplete regulation, the Illinois General Assembly should adopt the
proposed legislation authorizing a safe, dignified, and effective form
of physician-assisted suicide. The Illinois Assembly should not turn
away from its responsibility for Nancy DeSoto.
PETER G. DANIELS
522. See infra Appendix A §17.
523. See Pugliese, supra note 8, at 1325-29 (discussing.the requirements that any
physician-assisted suicide bill should contain).
524. See infra Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A

The Illinois Physician-Assisted Suicide Act
1. Purpose
The Purpose of this Act is permit a physician to provide a
terminally ill and suffering patient with a safe, effective, medical
means to end his own life. This law recognizes that a person
should not receive assistance in suicide if there is a means
reasonably available to alleviate a person's suffering. This act
extends criminal, civil, and professional immunity to physicians
and counselors who assist a requesting patient in suicide according
to this Act.
This Act is intended to create minimum standards and guidelines. It
is designed to confer a right to assisted suicide to a limited few and
only under limited circumstances. This Act recognizes that the
decision to end one's own life must be rational and freely made.
Because only a person who is suffering may request assistance
under this Act, the time it takes to receive assistance should be kept
to a minimum. This means that legal interference should be
confined solely to protecting a requesting person's free will and
well being. The safeguards provided in this act establish the
necessary protection of a requesting person's well being. Thus,
additional legal measures such as judicial proceedings should not
interfere unless there is a clear danger that a person is not acting
according to his own free will.
This law is intended to abrogate Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505
(1903), and any other settled decision of the State of Illinois or a
predecessor jurisdiction making it unlawful for a physician to
assist a person in suicide.
2. Definitions
a) "terminally ill" means
i) the patient suffers from a disease or other physical
condition that will eventually result in that patient's death,
except that "condition" does not mean
a) mere advanced age; or
b) the fact that the patient is currently alive
ii) For the purposes of this Act, a patient's death need not be
imminent for that person to be considered "terminally ill."
b) "suffering" means
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e)
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i) either that a patient is
a) experiencing extreme physical pain and/or
b) experiencing extreme physical discomfort
ii) and neither of which can be adequately alleviated through
reasonably available and reasonably known medical means.
"providing a medical means for a requesting patient to end his
own life" means
i) any of the following
a) providing the requesting patient with any lethal
substance or device and/or
b) prescribing to the requesting patient any lethal
substance or device
ii) which, in accordance with reasonable medical standards,
will enable the patient to end his own life in a comfortable
and dignified manner.
a "competent patient" means a patient who is:
i) conscious;
ii) capable of understanding his terminal diagnosis;
iii) capable of understanding his available alternatives to
assisted suicide;
iv) capable of understanding that he is requesting assistance in
suicide;
v) capable of understanding his own death; and
vi) able to clearly communicate health care decisions.
a "disinterested person" is one who
i) neither believes nor has reason to believe:
a) that he will inherit anything under the requesting
patient's will or
b) that he is related to the requesting patient or
c) that he is an heir of the requesting patient or
d) that he has any pecuniary interest in the patient's
death other than any standard medical fees for either
performing any services pursuant to this act or
providing either the lethal substance or device.
"related" means
i) With respect to the requesting patient, any of the following
a) a brother, sister, parent, child, grandchild, great
grand-child, aunt, uncle, cousin, second cousin,
third cousin, grand parent, great grand parent, stepbrother, step-sister, step-parent, step-child, step-
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grandchild, step-great grand-child step-aunt, stepuncle, step-cousin, step-second cousin, step-third
cousin, step-grand parent, step-great grand parent;
or
ii) a spouse or former spouse of any person described in sec.
(2)(f)(1)(a) of this Act; or
iii) a spouse or former spouse of the requesting patient.
g) "immediate family" means
i) either a brother, sister, parent, grand-parent child, grandchild, or spouse of the requesting patient.
h) "recorded" means either
i) written;
ii) video taped; or
iii) otherwise permanently documented in a manner approved
by a court of this State.
3. Procedure for Requesting Patient
a) Any Persons who is
i) at least 18 years of age;
ii) not pregnant; and
iii) competent.
b) May request medical assistance to suicide if:
i) the requesting patient has been diagnosed by the assisting
physician to be:
a) terminally ill;
b) suffering; and
c) competent
ii) the requesting patient executes a recorded first request
substantially similar to that provided under this Act;
iii) the requesting patient both agrees to and actually does
submit to an examination by another physician for the
purpose of confirming the assisting physician's diagnosis
that the requesting patient is:
a) terminally ill;
b) suffering; and
c) competent
iv) the requesting patient both agrees to and actually does
submit to an examination by a counselor for the purposes
of
a) confirming the assisting physician's diagnosis that
the requesting patient is competent; and
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b) determining whether the patient's request for
assistance in suicide is primarily by any of the
following
(1) duress;
(2) fraud; or
(3) coercion
c) determining whether the patient's request for
assistance in suicide is motivated primarily by any
of the following
(1) duress; or
(2) clinical depression or any other emotional or
psychological disorder
v) then executes a recorded second request substantially
similar to that provided under this act not sooner than 7
days (168 hours) after the first written request.
4. Any disinterested person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of
1987 or a successor statute, may provide a medical means for a
requesting patient to end his own life if:
a) the assisting physician is satisfied and confirms in writing a
form substantially like that provided by this Act:
i) that in his professional medical judgment the requesting
patient is:
(1)
terminally ill;
suffering; and
(2)
(3)
competent
ii) that the patient's request is not primarily motivated by
a) clinical depression or any other emotional or
psychological disorder
iii) the patient's request is not motivated by either
a) fraud;
b) duress; or
c) coercion of any kind
b) The requesting patient executes a signed first request
substantially like that provided by this Act
c) The requesting patient executes a signed second request not
sooner than 7 days (168 hours) after the first request,
substantially like that provided by this Act.
5. The assisting physician's diagnosis
a) that the patient is
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i) terminally ill;
ii) suffering; and
iii) competent to understand what he is requesting and its
consequences;
b) that the patient's request is not primarily motivated by
i) clinical depression or any other emotional or psychological
disorder; and
c) the patient's request is not motivated by
i) fraud, duress, or coercion of any kind,
d) must be confirmed in writing by a disinterested physician
licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 in a form
substantially like that provided by this Act.
6. The assisting physician's diagnosis
a) that the patient is competent to understand what he is
requesting and its consequences;
b) the patient's request is not primarily motivated by
i) clinical depression or any other emotional or psychological
disorder; and
c) the patient's request is not motivated by
i) fraud, duress, or coercion of any kind,
d) must be confirmed in writing by a disinterested counselor
licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987, in a form
substantially like that provided by this Act.
7. Effect of a finding of incompetence
a) The physician or counselor diagnosing the requesting patient as
incompetent must
i) note the diagnosis in the patient's medical records;
ii) destroy the patient's written request;
iii) make a good faith effort to notify other physician's or
counselors who have signed examination papers under this
Act; and
iv) make a good faith effort to notify the family of the
requesting patient of the request and of the finding of
competency.
8. The assisting physician and independent physician must inform the
requesting patient
a) Of his terminal diagnosis;
b) Of his estimated life expectancy;
c) Of the risks associated with the prescribed lethal substance;
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d) That the likely effect of the prescribed lethal substance is death;
e) Of alternatives to medical assistance to suicide including; and
i) comfort care and support services such as hospice
ii) treatment options or cure possibilities reasonably known
and available.
9. The assisting physician must, upon providing a medical means to
assist a requesting patient in suicide shall forward a copy of all
documents required under this Act to the Oversight Board.
10. A disinterested physician who assists another in ending his life
and who complies with the terms of this Act and who reasonably
believes that all of the terms of this Act are satisfied
a) will not be criminally liable for such actions under
i) either
a) 720 ILCS 5/9-1 Murder;
b) 720 ILCS 5/9-2 Second Degree Murder;
c) 720 ILCS 5/9-3 Involuntary Manslaughter and
Reckless homicide;
d) 720 ILCS 5/12-1 Assault;
e) 720 LLCS 5/12-2 Aggravated Assault;
f) 720 ILCS 5/12-3 Battery;
g) 720 ILCS 5/12-4 Aggravated Battery;
h) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.1 Heinous Battery;
i) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.5 Tampering with Food, Drugs
or Cosmetics;
j) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.6 Aggravated Battery of a Senior
Citizen;
k) 720 ILCS 5/12-5 Reckless Conduct;
1) 720 ILCS 5/12-19 Abuse and Neglect of a long
term care facility resident;
m) 720 ILCS 5/12-21 Criminal Neglect of an Elderly
Person;
n) 720 ILCS 5/12-31 Inducement to Commit Suicide;
or
ii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1 Solicitation of any offense listed in sec.
(9)(a)(1) of this Act or
iii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1.1 Solicitation of murder;
iv) 720 ILCS 6/8-1.2 Solicitation of murder for hire;
v) 720 ILCS 5/8-2 Conspiracy to commit any offense listed in
(9)(a)(1) of this Act;
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vi) 720 ILCS 5/8-4 Attempt to commit any offense listed in
sec. (9)(a)(1) of this Act; or
vii) any other criminal offense of this State or federal law
b) will not be civilly liable for such actions if
i) the physician performs his duties under this act in
accordance with the reasonable standards of his profession;
and
ii) the patient in properly using the means prescribed actually
dies
c) will not suffer professional disciplinary actions nor lose any
professional privileges.
11. A disinterested physician who confirms the assisting physician's
diagnosis under this Act
a) will not be criminally liable for such actions under
i) either
a) 720 ILCS 5/9-1 Murder;
b) 720 ILCS 5/9-2 Second Degree Murder;
c) 720 ILCS 5/9-3 Involuntary Manslaughter and
Reckless homicide;
d) 720 ILCS 5/12-1 Assault;
e) 720 ILCS 5/12-2 Aggravated Assault;
f) 720 ILCS 5/12-3 Battery;
g) 720 ILCS 5/12-4 Aggravated Battery;
h) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.1 Heinous Battery;
i) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.5 Tampering with Food, Drugs
or Cosmetics;
j) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.6 Aggravated Battery of a Senior
Citizen;
k) 720 ILCS 5/12-5 Reckless Conduct;
1) 720 ILCS 5/12-19 Abuse and Neglect of a long
term care facility resident;
m) 720 ILCS 5/12-21 Criminal Neglect of an Elderly
Person;
n) 720 ILCS 5/12-31 Inducement to Commit Suicide;
ii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1 Solicitation of any offense listed in sec.
(8)(a)(1) of this Act or
iii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1.1 Solicitation of murder or
iv) 720 ILCS 6/8-1.2 Solicitation of murder for hire or
v) 720 ILCS 5/8-2 Conspiracy to commit any offense listed in
(8)(a)(1) of this Act or
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vi) 720 ILCS 5/8-4 Attempt to commit any offense listed in
sec. (8)(a)(1) of this act or
vii) any other criminal offense of this Sate or federal law
b) will not be civilly liable for such actions if
i) the physician performs his duties under this act in
accordance with the reasonable standards of his profession.
c) will not suffer professional disciplinary actions nor lose any
professional privileges
12. A disinterested counselor who performs all required duties and
who complies with the terms of this Act
a) will not be considered criminally liable for such actions under
b) under
i) either
a) 720 ILCS 5/9-1 Murder;
b) 720 LLCS 5/9-2 Second Degree Murder;
c) 720 ILCS 5/9-3 Involuntary Manslaughter and
Reckless homicide;
d) 720 ILCS 5/12-1 Assault;
e) 720 ILCS 5/12-2 Aggravated Assault;
f) 720 ILCS 5/12-3 Battery;
g) 720 ILCS 5/12-4 Aggravated Battery;
h) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.1 Heinous Battery;
i) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.5 Tampering with Food, Drugs
or Cosmetics;
j) 720 ILCS 5/12-4.6 Aggravated Battery of a Senior
Citizen;
k) 720 ILCS 5/12-5 Reckless Conduct;
1) 720 ILCS 5/12-19 Abuse and Neglect of a long
term care facility resident;
m) 720 ILCS 5/12-21 Criminal Neglect of an Elderly
Person;
n) 720 ILCS 5/12-31 Inducement to Commit Suicide;
ii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1 Solicitation of any offense listed in sec.
(8)(a)(1) of this Act or
iii) 720 ILCS 5/8-1.1 Solicitation of murder or
iv) 720 ILCS 6/8-1.2 Solicitation of murder for hire or
v) 720 ILCS 5/8-2 Conspiracy to commit any offense listed in
(8)(a)(1) of this Act or
vi) 720 ILCS 5/8-4 Attempt to commit any offense listed in
sec. (8)(a)(1) of this Act or
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vii) any other criminal offense of this State or federal law
c) will not be civilly liable for such actions if
i) the counselor performs his duties under this act in
accordance with the reasonable standards of his profession.
d) will not suffer professional disciplinary actions nor lose any
professional privileges
13. Manner of requests
a) All requests for medical assistance to suicide must be in writing
or on videotape and be in accord with this subsection.
i) If in writing
a) must be signed by the requesting person;
b) must be signed by the assisting physician; and
c) must be signed by each witness.
ii) If on videotape
a) must be verbally acknowledged on videotape by the
requesting person;
b) must be verbally acknowledged on videotape by the
assisting physician; and
c) must be verbally acknowledged on videotape by
each witness.
recorded
requests for medical assistance to suicide must be
b) All
made in a form substantially similar to that provided by this
Act.
c) All recorded requests for medical assistance to suicide must be
witnessed by two persons,
i) one of whom must be disinterested;
ii) neither of whom is a physician or counselor who performs
any other duties under this Act with respect to the
requesting patient; and
iii) must be made in a form substantially similar to that
provided by this Act; and
d) Must be received by the State Medical Licensing Board
14. Clear, final act required
a) A patient requesting assistance under this Act must consciously
perform a clear, final act that evidences his intention to end his
life as well as his understanding that by performing the act, he
is ending his life; and
b) only the requesting patient can perform the final act which
actually causes his death.
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15. Waiting period
a) Under no circumstances shall a physician provide a requesting
patient with the means to end his life in less than seven (7)
days (168 hours) of his first written request.
16. Right to revoke request
a) A patient may revoke his request for assistance at any time by
notifying the licensing entity in writing.
b) If a patient revokes a request, and desires assistance, he must
issue a new request for that assistance.
c) If a patient who has revoked a request, again desires
assistance, he must make a new request and begin a new 7 day
waiting period
d) a patient is entitled to make an unlimited number of new
requests.
17. Either the assisting physician or the confirming physician must
a) treat the terminally ill in the ordinary course of practice or
b) treat patients using pain management or comfort care or a
similar treatment in the ordinary course of practice.
18. Duties of the Illinois Medical Licensing Board
a) The Board shall collect and maintain copies of all documents
required under this act for a period of not less than 15 years.
b) Documents required under this act shall be organized and filed
according to the name of the requesting patient.
c) The board shall make copies of a requesting patient's file
available only to the following persons who display valid
photo identification
i) An immediate family member of a requesting patient;
ii) any person who has signed a document required under this
act on behalf of a requesting patient; or
iii) A law enforcement official in the course of a legitimate
investigation.
d) No other person shall have the authority to review a requesting
patient's file
19. Affect on insurance
a) Making a request under this Act shall not be a condition, term
or factor to be considered to the issuance or maintenance of any
insurance policy in Illinois
b) Not making a request under this Act shall not be a condition,
term or factor to be considered to the issuance or maintenance
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of any insurance policy in Illinois
20. No duty to perform physician-assisted suicide
a) No physician or counselor or any other person will be required
to participate in any activity authorized by this Act.
b) No Medical organization will be required to participate in any
activity authorized by this Act
c) Medical organizations may prohibit participation in any activity
under this Act on premises owned by the organization
d) No medical organization may require nor forbid a physician to
participate in any activity authorized by this Act
21. General
a) Under no circumstances should it be considered to be
inherently, prima facie or presumed to be unreasonable for a
physician to assist a patient under the terms of this Act.
b) A patient who receives assistance in ending his life under this
act is considered for all relevant purposes to have died from the
terminal condition
c) Any physician or counselor who is not disinterested and
performs any of the duties under this Act is presumed to have
exerted undue influence over the patient and is stripped of all
immunities conferred by this law unless that person
affirmatively rebuts this presumption
i) through clear and convincing evidence for any civil or
administrative or professional proceeding
ii) beyond a reasonable doubt for any criminal proceeding
d) Under no circumstances may any person other than that person
ending his life under the Act either
i) request the assistance or
ii) perform the clear final act
22. Penalties
a) Any person who employs fraud, duress, or coercion with the
intent of influencing a person to request assistance under this
Act
i) shall be guilty of a class 2 felony; and
ii) shall not be subject to any immunities conferred under this
Act
b) Any person who knowingly forges a request for assistance to
suicide
i) shall be guilty of a class 2 felony; and
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ii) shall not be subject to any of the immunities conferred
under this Act
c) An Assisting Physician who fails to forward copies of all
documents required under this Act to the Oversight board
within 15 days
i) shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; but
ii) shall otherwise be entitled to the immunities conferred
under this Act
d) The penalties in this Act do not preclude criminal penalties
otherwise available and not inconsistent with the terms of this
Act.
23. Severability
a) Any part of this Act which is found to be invalid as to a
particular person or a particular circumstance will remain valid
for all other persons and all other circumstances
b) Any part of this Act adjudged by a court of competent
jurisdiction to violate either the Illinois Constitution or United
States Constitution, will not affect any other provision of this
Act unless
i) it would be impracticable to do so
ii) the remaining provisions do not adequately protect the
public.
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APPENDIX B

Physician's Diagnosis Form
To the best of my knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry, I believe
that [Requesting patient's name]
is 18 years of age or older
has made a valid request for medical assistance to suicide
In my professional medical judgment as a physician licensed under
Medical Practice Act of 1987, [Requesting Patient' name]
suffers from a disease, illness or condition that will eventually
result in this person's death
is experiencing extreme physical pain or discomfort
is competent to understand that he or she is requesting medical
assistance to suicide and that this assistance will provide him or her
the means to end his or her own life
is not primarily motivated to make a request for medical assistance
to suicide by clinical depression or any other emotional or
psychological disorder
is not motivated to make a request for medical assistance to suicide
by fraud, duress, coercion of any kind
is not pregnant
I have informed [Requesting Patient' name],
of his or her terminal diagnosis
of his or her estimated life expectancy
of the risks associated with the prescribed lethal substance
that the likely effect of the prescribed lethal substance is death
of alternatives to suicide including comfort care and support
services such as hospice
Physician's Name (printed)
A
a

Physician's Signature

Date
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APPENDIX C

Counselor's Diagnosis Form
To the best of my knowledge and after a reasonable inquiry, I believe
that [Requesting patient's name]
is 18 years of age or older
has made a valid request for medical assistance to suicide
In my professional medical judgment as a Counselor licensed under
, [Requesting Patient' name]
is competent to understand that he or she is requesting medical
assistance to suicide and that this assistance will provide him or her
the means to end his or her own life
is not primarily motivated to make a request for medical assistance
to suicide by clinical depression or any other emotional or
psychological disorder
is not motivated to make a request for medical assistance to suicide
by fraud, duress, coercion of any kind
Counselor's Name (printed)

Counselor's Signature

Date
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APPENDIX D

Patient's First Request for Medical Assistance to
Suicide
I, [Requesting Patient's Name], am 18 years of age or older and not
pregnant.
I am suffering from

,

which my physician has

determined is a terminal condition. I understand that this condition
will eventually result in my death.
I am also suffering from severe pain and / or severe physical
discomfort which cannot be soothed by any way that I know of.

Because my pain or physical discomfort cannot be
soothed by any other way, I now request a
medical means to commit suicide.
I am fully competent, and not primarily motivated to request medical
assistance to suicide by depression or any other mental disorder.
I understand and have been fully informed by the physician who will
prescribe a substance that allows me to end my own life
of my estimated life expectancy
of the risks associated with the substance my physician has
prescribed to allow me to end my own life
that the likely and intended effect of the substance my physician
has prescribed for me is my death.
of alternatives to suicide such as comfort care which includes
medication to relieve my pain or discomfort and support services
such as Hospice.
Requesting Patient's Name
(Printed)

Requesting Patient's
Signature

Date

Assisting Physician's Name
(Printed)

Assisting Physician's
Signature

Date

Witness' Name (printed)

Witness' Signature

Date

Witness' Name (printed)

Witness' Signature

Date
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APPENDIX E

Patient's Second Request for Medical Assistance to
Suicide
I, [Requesting Patient's Name], am 18 years of age or older and not
pregnant.
I am suffering from

,

which my physician has

determined is a terminal condition. I understand that this condition
will eventually result in my death.
I am also suffering from severe pain and / or severe physical
discomfort which cannot be soothed by any way that I know of.

Because my pain or physical discomfort cannot be
soothed by any other way, I now request a

medical means to commit suicide.
I am fully competent, and not primarily motivated to request medical
assistance to suicide by depression or any other mental disorder.
I understand and have been fully informed by the physician who will
prescribe a substance that allows me to end my own life and another
physician
of my estimated life expectancy
of the risks associated with the substance my physician has
prescribed to allow me to end my own life
that the likely and intended effect of the substance my physician
has prescribed for me is my death.
of alternatives to suicide such as comfort care which includes
medication to relieve my pain or discomfort and support services
such as Hospice.
I have consulted with a with a counselor before making this decision.
Requesting Patient's Name
(Printed)

Requesting Patient's
Signature

Date

Assisting Physician's Name
(Printed)

Assisting Physician's
Signature

Date

Witness' Name (printed)

Witness' Signature

Date

Witness' Name (rinted)

Witness' Sianature

Date

